CIV § 1953

Certain tenant waivers in leases are void: CIV § 1953

CIV § 1953 voids residential lease clauses waiving rights to deposits, entry, notices, hearings, litigation, or landlord duty of care to prevent injuries.

Official text CIV § 1953 — California

(a) Any provision of a lease or rental agreement of a dwelling by which the lessee agrees to modify or waive any of the following rights shall be void as contrary to public policy:

(1) His rights or remedies under Section 1950.5 or 1954.

(2) His right to assert a cause of action against the lessor which may arise in the future.

(3) His right to a notice or hearing required by law.

(4) His procedural rights in litigation in any action involving his rights and obligations as a tenant.

(5) His right to have the landlord exercise a duty of care to prevent personal injury or personal property damage where that duty is imposed by law.

(b) Any provision of a lease or rental agreement of a dwelling by which the lessee agrees to modify or waive a statutory right, where the modification or waiver is not void under subdivision (a) or under Section 1942.1, 1942.5, or 1954, shall be void as contrary to public policy unless the lease or rental agreement is presented to the lessee before he takes actual possession of the premises. This subdivision does not apply to any provisions modifying or waiving a statutory right in agreements renewing leases or rental agreements where the same provision was also contained in the lease or rental agreement which is being renewed.

(c) This section shall apply only to leases and rental agreements executed on or after January 1, 1976.

Text as published in the 2026 snapshot of the code.

Source: Vaquill Open US Law, compiled from official state publishers (huggingface.co), reproduced under license CC BY 4.0.

Read this provision at the official source →

What it actually says

Section 1953 answers the question people ask when they are told "you signed it". Subdivision (a) makes void, as contrary to public policy, any provision of a residential lease by which the tenant agrees to modify or waive five categories of right: rights and remedies under § 1950.5 (the security deposit) or § 1954 (entry); the right to assert a cause of action against the landlord that may arise in the future; the right to a notice or hearing required by law; procedural rights in litigation about the tenancy; and the right to have the landlord exercise a duty of care to prevent personal injury or property damage where the law imposes that duty. These are void whether or not the tenant read them, negotiated them or initialled them.

Subdivision (b) deals with everything else. A clause waiving some other statutory right, not already void under subdivision (a) or under §§ 1942.1, 1942.5 or 1954, is void as contrary to public policy unless the lease was presented to the tenant before the tenant took actual possession. That is a timing rule with a practical edge: the addendum produced on move-in day, after the keys have changed hands, sits on the wrong side of it. Renewals are treated differently — the subdivision does not apply to a provision carried over from the lease being renewed.

Subdivision (c) limits the whole section to leases and rental agreements executed on or after 1 January 1976. Reading a clause and deciding whether it falls in subdivision (a), in subdivision (b) or outside the section entirely is exactly the kind of question to put to a lawyer with the lease in front of them.

When it applies

The lease says the deposit is non-refundable or waives the itemized statement
A clause allowing the landlord to enter at any time without notice
A clause saying the tenant releases the landlord from any future claim
A clause saying the landlord is not responsible for injury from anything on the premises
An addendum handed to you to sign on the day you collected the keys
The landlord's answer to every complaint is that you agreed to it in writing

What this section does not say

It does not void the whole lease. The section strikes the offending provision as contrary to public policy; the rest of the agreement is not swept away with it.
It does not make every disadvantageous term void. Subdivision (a) is a closed list of five categories, and subdivision (b) turns on timing rather than on whether the term is a bad bargain.
It does not apply to commercial leases. The section speaks of a lease or rental agreement "of a dwelling", so shop and office leases are outside it.
It does not reach old agreements. Subdivision (c) confines the section to leases executed on or after 1 January 1976.
It is not the unconscionability doctrine. A harsh but non-listed clause is tested under § 1670.5, which asks a different question and gives the court different options.

Worked examples

Invented situations, written to show how the wording bites. They are not real cases, not judgments and not precedent, and nothing here predicts what would happen in yours.

Illustrative example

A lease says the cleaning deposit is non-refundable and that the landlord may enter whenever he considers it necessary. When the tenant objects, the landlord points at the signature.

How the wording applies

Subdivision (a) makes void as contrary to public policy a provision by which the tenant modifies or waives rights under the deposit section or under section 1954. It turns on the clause falling within one of the five listed categories, not on whether the bargain was fair overall, and the rest of the lease survives, because the section strikes the provision rather than the agreement.

How the parties settled it

Both clauses are struck by written addendum, the landlord adopts the 24-hour written notice practice, and the deposit is accounted for at the end of the tenancy in the ordinary way.

Illustrative example

On the day the keys are handed over, a tenant is given an extra page to sign waiving a statutory right, having never seen it before.

How the wording applies

Subdivision (b) turns on timing: a waiver of a right under a statute other than those listed in subdivision (a) is void unless it was presented to the tenant before they took possession. The fact this hinges on is the sequence of that day, because a document produced as the keys change hands is not a term the tenant had any chance to weigh before committing.

How the parties settled it

The addendum is withdrawn, and if the landlord wants the term in future it is offered before the next renewal is signed, with time to consider it.

How courts have read it

Decisions construing this provision. The question and the summary are ours; the quoted sentence is the court's own words, taken from the published opinion. These are the decisions in our corpus, not every decision there is, and nothing here predicts any other case. Reported 1991 to 2017.

Lewis Operating Corp. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 4th 940 (2011)

Court of Appeal

What the court had to decide

Whether a waiver of liability for negligence in a residential lease, specifically for use of a tenant-only health club amenity, is void under Civil Code section 1953(a)(5).

What it held

The waiver is enforceable because the health club amenity is a nonessential, noncore function that goes beyond bare habitability, so the landlord may require a waiver as a condition of use, and no public policy is violated.

In the court's words

We conclude that where a landlord chooses to enhance its offering by providing an onsite health club or exercise facility that goes well beyond bare habitability, there is no reason why the landlord may not protect itself by requiring the tenant, as a condition of use of the amenity, to execute the same waiver or release of liability that could lawfully be required by the operator of a separate, stand-alone health club or exercise facility.

Jaramillo v. JH Real Estate Partners, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 4th 394 (2003)

Court of Appeal

What the court had to decide

Does Civil Code section 1953, subdivision (a)(4), preclude a residential lease from requiring binding arbitration of disputes involving a tenant's rights and obligations?

What it held

Yes, the court held that section 1953(a)(4) establishes a general rule that a tenant cannot validly agree in a residential lease to binding arbitration of disputes regarding his or her rights and obligations as a tenant.

In the court's words

We think that the most reasonable interpretation of section 1953, subdivision (a)(4), is that it establishes the general rule that a tenant of residential premises cannot validly agree, in a residential lease agreement, to binding arbitration to resolve disputes regarding his or her rights and obligations as a tenant.

Source: Caselaw Access Project, CC0 1.0 Universal (public domain dedication).

Related sections

CIV § 1950.5 Security deposit capped at one month's rent - CIV § 1950.5 CIV § 1954 California Civil Code § 1954 - When a landlord may enter, and how much notice is required CIV § 1942.5 180-Day Retaliatory Eviction Ban | CIV § 1942.5 CIV § 1670.5 Courts May Refuse Unconscionable Contracts - CIV § 1670.5

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We copy this text from the official publisher and re-check it against that source on every page load, but we cannot guarantee it is complete, current or free of error, and we accept no liability for any reliance on it. An amendment can take effect before a consolidation catches up. The publisher's own copy is linked below; where the two differ, it is the official one that counts.

This page reproduces the text of CIV § 1953 in force at the date shown and explains it in general terms. It is not legal advice and takes no account of the circumstances of your case, which can change the answer completely. For a live dispute, for limitation periods, and before taking any step in court, consult a qualified lawyer in California.

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