N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 72

Grandparent Visitation: N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 72

N.Y. DRL § 72 allows grandparent visitation if a parent dies or in equity, and custody for extraordinary circumstances, such as twenty-four months separation.

Official text N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 72 — New York

§ 72. Special proceeding or habeas corpus to obtain visitation rights or custody in respect to certain infant grandchildren. 1. Where either or both of the parents of a minor child, residing within this state, is or are deceased, or where circumstances show that conditions exist which equity would see fit to intervene, a grandparent or the grandparents of such child may apply to the supreme court by commencing a special proceeding or for a writ of habeas corpus to have such child brought before such court, or may apply to the family court pursuant to subdivision (b) of section six hundred fifty-one of the family court act; and on the return thereof, the court, by order, after due notice to the parent or any other person or party having the care, custody, and control of such child, to be given in such manner as the court shall prescribe, may make such directions as the best interest of the child may require, for visitation rights for such grandparent or grandparents in respect to such child.

  • 2. (a) Where a grandparent or the grandparents of a minor child, residing within this state, can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court the existence of extraordinary circumstances, such grandparent or grandparents of such child may apply to the supreme court by commencing a special proceeding or for a writ of habeas corpus to have such child brought before such court, or may apply to family court pursuant to subdivision (b) of section six hundred fifty-one of the family court act; and on the return thereof, the court, by order, after due notice to the parent or any other person or party having the care, custody, and control of such child, to be given in such manner as the court shall prescribe, may make such directions as the best interests of the child may require, for custody rights for such grandparent or grandparents in respect to such child. An extended disruption of custody, as such term is defined in this section, shall constitute an extraordinary circumstance.
  • (b) For the purposes of this section "extended disruption of custody" shall include, but not be limited to, a prolonged separation of the respondent parent and the child for at least twenty-four continuous months during which the parent voluntarily relinquished care and control of the child and the child resided in the household of the petitioner grandparent or grandparents, provided, however, that the court may find that extraordinary circumstances exist should the prolonged separation have lasted for less than twenty-four months.
  • (c) Nothing in this section shall limit the ability of parties to enter into consensual custody agreements absent the existence of extraordinary circumstances.

Text as published in the 2026 snapshot of the code.

Source: Vaquill Open US Law, compiled from official state publishers (huggingface.co), reproduced under license CC BY 4.0.

Read this provision at the official source →

What it actually says

Subdivision 1 is the visitation route and it has two doors. A grandparent may apply - by special proceeding or writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court, or to the Family Court under Family Court Act § 651(b) - where either or both parents of a minor child residing in New York are deceased, or where circumstances show that conditions exist which equity would see fit to intervene. On the return of the application, after due notice to the parent or other person having care, custody and control of the child, the court may make such directions for visitation as the best interest of the child may require. So there are two questions in every such case: whether the grandparent has standing to be heard at all, and only then what the child's best interests require.

Subdivision 2 is the custody route and the threshold is deliberately higher. A grandparent may apply for custody rights only on demonstrating, to the court's satisfaction, the existence of extraordinary circumstances. The subdivision then defines one instance conclusively: an extended disruption of custody constitutes an extraordinary circumstance. Paragraph (b) defines that term as including, but not limited to, a prolonged separation of the respondent parent and the child for at least twenty-four continuous months during which the parent voluntarily relinquished care and control and the child lived in the grandparent's household - and expressly permits the court to find extraordinary circumstances where the separation was shorter.

Paragraph (c) preserves the parties' freedom to make consensual custody agreements without any extraordinary circumstances at all.

When it applies

  • A parent has died and the surviving parent stops contact with that side of the family.
  • Grandparents who saw a grandchild regularly are cut off after a family falling-out.
  • A child has lived with grandparents for two years while a parent was absent.
  • Grandparents want custody after a prolonged period of caring for the child.
  • A family wants to agree contact arrangements without going to court.

What this section does not say

  • It does not give grandparents a right to see a child. It gives a route to apply, and the court then decides on the child's best interests.
  • The custody threshold is not best interests alone. Extraordinary circumstances must be established first.
  • It does not define "circumstances which equity would see fit to intervene" - standing is decided case by case.
  • It does not extend to other relatives. The section speaks of a grandparent or grandparents.
  • It requires the child to be residing within New York.

Worked examples

Invented situations, written to show how the wording bites. They are not real cases, not judgments and not precedent, and nothing here predicts what would happen in yours.

Illustrative example

A couple's daughter died last year. Her husband, now in a new relationship, has stopped all contact between the children and their maternal grandparents; birthday cards go unanswered.

How the wording applies

Subdivision 1 opens the visitation route where either or both parents of a minor child residing in New York are deceased, so standing here follows from the death rather than from having to persuade anyone that equity should intervene. Once that door is open the only question left is what the children's best interests require, decided after notice to the person who has their care.

How the parties settled it

They agree a monthly video call and two afternoons in each school holiday for a year, reviewed at the end of it rather than assumed permanent, and the grandparents undertake not to discuss the adults' falling-out with the children.

Illustrative example

Grandparents who had a grandchild every Saturday for years are cut off after a bitter argument with the child's parents about a loan.

How the wording applies

With both parents alive, standing depends on circumstances showing that conditions exist which equity would see fit to intervene, and the section does not define that phrase - it is decided case by case. What such cases generally turn on is the relationship that existed with the child before the cut-off, rather than the merits of the argument between the adults.

How the parties settled it

The loan is dealt with separately and in writing, and contact resumes at one Sunday a month on the express footing that neither side raises the money in front of the child.

Illustrative example

A child has lived with grandparents for more than two years while a parent, who left of their own accord, has been in touch only occasionally. That parent now wants the child back next month.

How the wording applies

Custody under subdivision 2 requires extraordinary circumstances to be demonstrated before best interests is even reached, and an extended disruption of custody is defined to include a prolonged separation of at least twenty-four continuous months during which the parent voluntarily relinquished care and control and the child lived in the grandparents' household. The word carrying it is "voluntarily": a parent kept away by illness or detention stands differently from one who chose to be absent.

How the parties settled it

They agree a staged return across a school year, beginning with weekends and holidays, with the child's school place and routine left untouched until the final step.

How courts have read it

Decisions construing this provision. The question and the summary are ours; the quoted sentence is the court's own words, taken from the published opinion. These are the decisions in our corpus, not every decision there is, and nothing here predicts any other case. Reported 2003 to 2017.

Christy T. v. Diana T., 156 A.D.3d 1159 (2017)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether the evidence supported a finding of extraordinary circumstances under Domestic Relations Law §72(2)(a) and (b) based on an extended disruption of custody.

What it held

The court held that the maternal grandmother met her burden of establishing extraordinary circumstances because the child had lived with her for nearly half her life and the mother voluntarily relinquished care and control without completing treatment.

In the court's words
Given this history, we find that Family Court properly determined that the maternal grandmother met her burden of establishing the existence of extraordinary circumstances (see Matter of Rumpff v Schorpp, 133 AD3d at 1110-1111; Matter of Ferguson v Skelly, 80 AD3d 903, 905 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 710 [2011]).

Winn v. Diaz, 156 A.D.3d 645 (2017)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Did the Family Court properly determine that the grandmother had standing under Domestic Relations Law § 72 (1) and that visitation was in the child's best interests?

What it held

The Family Court providently exercised its discretion in determining that the grandmother had standing to petition for visitation under Domestic Relations Law § 72 (1) and that visitation was in the child's best interests.

In the court's words
Here, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in determining that the grandmother had standing to petition for visitation pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72 (1) (see Matter of Gort v Kull, 96 AD3d 842, 843 [2012]).

Sellers v. Brown, 155 A.D.3d 1047 (2017)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether a grandparent has standing to seek custody under Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) when the child's parent is deceased.

What it held

Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) grants a grandparent standing to seek visitation, not custody, when a parent is deceased; custody requires a showing of extraordinary circumstances under §72(2).

In the court's words
Domestic Relations Law § 72 (1) gives a grandparent standing to seek visitation when one or both of the parents are deceased, but does not apply to cases in which the grandparent seeks custody.

McAvoy v. McAvoy, 155 A.D.3d 867 (2017)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether the paternal grandfather had standing under Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) to seek visitation based on equitable considerations.

What it held

The Family Court properly dismissed the grandfather's petition for visitation because he lacked standing; equitable considerations did not warrant judicial intervention.

In the court's words
Here, the Family Court’s determination that the grandfather lacked standing is supported by the record.

Monroe v. Monroe, 154 A.D.3d 1110 (2017)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Did the grandparents have standing to seek visitation under Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) based on allegations that the mother deliberately denied them access to the children since birth without justification?

What it held

The court held that the grandparents' allegations were sufficient to confer standing to seek visitation, as the mother's deliberate and immediate efforts to preclude any relationship without reasonable justification constituted conditions that equity would see fit to intervene.

In the court's words
On the sparse record before us, we find that the proof adduced in support of the grandparents’ petition to be sufficient to confer standing to seek visitation with their grandchildren

Galizia v. Galizia, 151 A.D.3d 851 (2017)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether the paternal grandmother had standing under Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) to petition for visitation with the subject child.

What it held

The grandmother lacked standing because equitable considerations did not warrant judicial intervention for the visitation she sought.

In the court's words
Here, the Family Court’s determination that the grandmother lacked standing is supported by the record.

Source: Caselaw Access Project, CC0 1.0 Universal (public domain dedication).

Related sections

N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 241 DRL § 241: withholding visitation can suspend maintenance - but never child support N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 234 DRL § 234: who stays in the house while the divorce runs N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 200 DRL § 200: the grounds for a judgment of separation in New York

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We copy this text from the official publisher and re-check it against that source on every page load, but we cannot guarantee it is complete, current or free of error, and we accept no liability for any reliance on it. An amendment can take effect before a consolidation catches up. The publisher's own copy is linked below; where the two differ, it is the official one that counts.

This page reproduces the text of N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 72 in force at the date shown and explains it in general terms. It is not legal advice and takes no account of the circumstances of your case, which can change the answer completely. For a live dispute, for limitation periods, and before taking any step in court, consult a qualified lawyer in New York.

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