GOL § 17-101: putting an old debt back on the clock

An acknowledgment or promise contained in a writing signed by the party to be charged is the only competent evidence that takes an action out of the limitation periods in the CPLR. The section does not say what wording is enough, so everything turns on how that email reads - whether it acknowledges the debt or promises to pay it, as against discussing terms while disputing that anything is owed.

They agree a reduced lump sum in full and final settlement of the account, with the agency confirming in writing that it closes the file and makes no further contact with the debtor's employer.

The last sentence of the section is a rule pulling the other way: nothing here alters the effect of a payment of principal or interest. Payment operates on the limitation period by its own route and needs no writing at all, so the fact that matters is not that nothing was signed but that money moved.

They agree a fixed instalment plan on a reduced balance, with a written term that no further payment will be taken over the phone and that every instalment is receipted.

The section requires an acknowledgment or a promise, signed by the party to be charged. A document that admits the balance while refusing to pay it is not obviously either, which is why the exact wording carries the entire question here - and construing it is a matter for a court, not something the section settles.

They agree to treat the letter as deciding nothing either way and to deal with the underlying loan on its own footing, fixing a figure and a payment date instead of arguing about a sentence written in temper.

Did Towers sufficiently allege that written responses from HHC constituted an acknowledgment or new promise under General Obligations Law § 17-101 so as to restart the contractual limitations period?

For pleading purposes, Towers sufficiently alleged that HHC's written responses acknowledged its contractual obligation, thereby restarting the limitations period under General Obligations Law § 17-101.

However, for pleading purposes, Towers has sufficiently alleged that the contractual limitations period was restarted pursuant to General Obligations Law § 17-101.

Whether a signed writing acknowledging a debt and waiving the statute of limitations defense constitutes an acknowledgment or new promise under General Obligations Law § 17-101 to renew the statute of limitations.

The signed letter, which acknowledged the debt and waived the statute of limitations defense, satisfied General Obligations Law § 17-101, thereby renewing the statute of limitations and making the action timely.

A renewed statute of limitations for plaintiff’s claims accordingly began to run no earlier than August 26, 2010 and, thus, the commencement of this action on July 2, 2015 was timely.

Whether a writing submitted by the plaintiff constituted an acknowledgment under General Obligations Law § 17-101 so as to restart the statute of limitations period.

The writing did not constitute an acknowledgment under General Obligations Law § 17-101 because it neither acknowledged a debt owed to the plaintiff nor indicated that the defendants intended to pay the plaintiff.

the writing submitted by the plaintiff neither acknowledged a debt owed to the plaintiff, nor indicated that the defendants intended to pay the plaintiff.

Does General Obligations Law § 17-101 preclude a statute of limitations defense in a breach of contract action that includes a claim for reformation?

The court held that General Obligations Law § 17-101 is not inapplicable to a breach of contract action that includes a claim for reformation, and remitted for a hearing to determine whether the statute of limitations bars that claim.

Thus, we conclude that defendants’ reading of the statute is much too narrow, and we remit for a hearing to determine whether the statute of limitations applies to bar the claim for reformation (see CPLR 7502 [b]; Matter of Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v Luckie, 85 NY2d at 202; Matter of Paver & Wildfoerster [Catholic High School Assn.], 38 NY2d 669, 673-674 [1976]).

Whether the inclusion of SCRIE credits as a liability in plaintiff's annual reports constitutes an acknowledgment of a debt signed by the debtor sufficient to revive time-barred claims under General Obligations Law § 17-101.

The court held that annual reports not signed by the debtor are insufficient to constitute an acknowledgment under GOB § 17-101, and thus cannot revive time-barred claims.

Nor is the inclusion of the SCRIE credits as a liability in the plaintiff’s annual reports sufficient to constitute an acknowledgment of a debt signed by the debtor so as to revive the time-barred claims under General Obligations Law § 17-101

Whether the restructuring agreement constitutes an acknowledgment or promise under General Obligations Law § 17-101 sufficient to revive a time-barred debt.

The documentary evidence fails to resolve all factual issues concerning whether the restructuring agreement constitutes an acknowledgment or promise under GOB § 17-101, so dismissal on that ground was properly denied.

We agree with the motion court that the documentary evidence submitted in support of defendant’s motion to dismiss fails to resolve all factual issues concerning whether the parties’ restructuring agreement constitutes an “acknowledgment or promise” within the meaning of General Obligations Law § 17-101, and is sufficient to revive defendant’s time-barred claim on certain debts owed by plaintiff under bonds issued in 1997.