N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-703

Must Be in Writing: N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-703

Under N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-703, real property sales, trusts, and leases for longer than one year are void unless in a signed writing.

Official text N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-703 — New York

§ 5-703. Conveyances and contracts concerning real property required to be in writing. 1. An estate or interest in real property, other than a lease for a term not exceeding one year, or any trust or power, over or concerning real property, or in any manner relating thereto, cannot be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared, unless by act or operation of law, or by a deed or conveyance in writing, subscribed by the person creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent, thereunto authorized by writing. But this subdivision does not affect the power of a testator in the disposition of his real property by will; nor prevent any trust from arising or being extinguished by implication or operation of law, nor any declaration of trust from being proved by a writing subscribed by the person declaring the same.

  • 2. A contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of any real property, or an interest therein, is void unless the contract or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing, subscribed by the party to be charged, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
  • 3. A contract to devise real property or establish a trust of real property, or any interest therein or right with reference thereto, is void unless the contract or some note or memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith, or by his lawfully authorized agent.
  • 4. Nothing contained in this section abridges the powers of courts of equity to compel the specific performance of agreements in cases of part performance.

Text as published in the 2026 snapshot of the code.

Source: Vaquill Open US Law, compiled from official state publishers (huggingface.co), reproduced under license CC BY 4.0.

Read this provision at the official source →

What it actually says

This is the statute of frauds for land, and it has four subdivisions that do different jobs. Subdivision 1 concerns the transfer itself: an estate or interest in real property - other than a lease for a term not exceeding one year - or any trust or power over real property, cannot be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared except by act or operation of law or by a signed deed or conveyance in writing. If an agent signs, the agent's authority must itself be in writing. Wills and trusts arising by implication or operation of law are excepted.

Subdivision 2 concerns the promise: a contract for a lease longer than one year, or for the sale of real property or an interest in it, is void unless the contract or a note or memorandum of it, expressing the consideration, is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by an agent authorized in writing. Two details are easy to miss. The memorandum must express the consideration. And the signature required is that of the party being sued - a document signed by the buyer alone can bind the buyer and not the seller.

Subdivision 3 adds contracts to devise real property or to establish a trust of it. Subdivision 4 is the escape hatch, and the reason a handshake deal is not always dead: nothing in the section abridges the power of courts of equity to compel specific performance in cases of part performance. That doctrine has its own demanding requirements about conduct unequivocally referable to the alleged agreement, and it is an equitable remedy rather than a right.

When it applies

  • A seller agrees a price for a plot by handshake and then refuses to go through with it.
  • An oral promise that a relative would inherit or receive a property is disputed after the fact.
  • A three-year lease was agreed by email and one side denies being bound.
  • A buyer has paid money and taken possession on the strength of an unwritten agreement.
  • A memorandum exists but does not state the price.

What this section does not say

  • It does not require a formal contract for a short lease. A lease for a term not exceeding one year is outside subdivisions 1 and 2.
  • It does not make every unwritten land agreement unenforceable. Subdivision 4 preserves specific performance for part performance in equity.
  • It does not require both parties to sign. The signature that matters is that of the party to be charged.
  • It does not deal with brokers' commissions. That writing requirement is General Obligations Law § 5-701(a)(10).
  • It does not say what a sufficient memorandum contains beyond writing, signature and consideration - the rest is decided case by case.

Worked examples

Invented situations, written to show how the wording bites. They are not real cases, not judgments and not precedent, and nothing here predicts what would happen in yours.

Illustrative example

A buyer and a seller shake hands on a plot of land. The buyer pays a deposit, clears the brush over two weekends and puts up a fence. The seller then receives a better offer and says there was never a deal.

How the wording applies

A contract for the sale of real property or an interest in it is void unless the contract, or a note or memorandum of it expressing the consideration, is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged. Subdivision 4 is the escape hatch - nothing in the section abridges the power of courts of equity to compel specific performance in cases of part performance - and that turns on whether the buyer's conduct is unequivocally referable to the agreement alleged, which is a demanding test and an equitable remedy rather than a right.

How the parties settled it

The seller repays the deposit and the documented cost of the clearing and the fence, and the buyer releases any claim to the plot, so that neither of them has to test the part-performance doctrine.

Illustrative example

A small business and a building owner settle a three-year lease across a chain of emails covering rent, start date and a fit-out contribution. The business takes the keys, and the owner then denies being bound to anything.

How the wording applies

A contract for a lease of longer than one year is void unless a note or memorandum expressing the consideration is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged. The signature that decides this is the owner's, not the tenant's - a document signed by one side can bind that side and leave the other free.

How the parties settled it

They sign a short lease on the terms the emails already record, dated from the day the keys changed hands, rather than arguing about what an email chain amounts to.

Illustrative example

Two relatives sign a note agreeing that one will buy out the other's share of a house "at a fair value to be worked out between us". A year later they cannot agree a figure and disagree about whether anything was ever settled.

How the wording applies

Subdivision 2 requires the note or memorandum to express the consideration, which is the requirement most often overlooked. The argument turns on whether the price is expressed in the document at all: an agreement to agree a figure later is not the same thing as one that states it.

How the parties settled it

They name a single valuer in a signed addendum and accept that valuer's figure as the price, which supplies the one term the original note left open.

How courts have read it

Decisions construing this provision. The question and the summary are ours; the quoted sentence is the court's own words, taken from the published opinion. These are the decisions in our corpus, not every decision there is, and nothing here predicts any other case. Reported 2003 to 2017.

Solartech Renewables, LLC v. Vitti, 156 A.D.3d 995 (2017)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether the alleged contract concerning real property satisfied the statute of frauds under General Obligations Law § 5-703 when the party to be charged did not sign any document.

What it held

Because no document was signed by the defendant, the alleged contract did not satisfy the statute of frauds and is void.

In the court's words
Because no document was signed by defendant, the alleged contract—assuming one was ever formed—did not satisfy the statute of frauds and is void.

Isabella v. Jackling, 155 A.D.3d 1650 (2017)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether a contract for the sale of real property existed under General Obligations Law § 5-703(2) where the auction was conditional and the seller rejected the plaintiff's bid.

What it held

The court held that no valid contract existed because the auction documents made the auction conditional and the defendants rejected the plaintiff's bid by declining to sign the purchase offer.

In the court's words
Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, we conclude that defendants met their initial burden on their motion by establishing that no valid contract existed inasmuch as the auction documents provided that the auction was conditional (see generally Stonehill Capital Mgt. LLC v Bank of the W., 28 NY3d 439, 449 [2016]), and defendants rejected plaintiff’s bid by declining to sign the purchase offer (see General Obligations Law § 5-703 [2]; Tikvah Realty, LLC v Schwartz, 43 AD3d 909, 909 [2d Dept 2007]; see also Post Hill, LLC v E. Tetz & Sons, Inc., 122 AD3d 1126, 1127-1128 [3d Dept 2014]).

LaCarrubba v. Outdoors Clothing Corp., 57 Misc. 3d 69 (2017)

trial courts

What the court had to decide

Whether an alleged oral agreement to lease real property for five years violates the statute of frauds under General Obligations Law § 5-703(2).

What it held

The court held that the alleged oral agreement to lease the premises for five years is in violation of the statute of frauds and therefore unenforceable.

In the court's words
To the extent that landlords seek to enforce a stand-alone oral agreement to lease the premises to tenant for five years, the alleged oral agreement was in violation of the statute of frauds (see General Obligations Law § 5-703 [2]; Rosen v 250 W. 50 St. Corp., 296 NY 567 [1946]; 410 BPR Corp., 51 AD3d at 716-717).

Titte v. Butler, 143 A.D.3d 808 (2016)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether an alleged oral authorization to a brother to sign a contract for the sale of real property satisfies the writing requirement under General Obligations Law § 5-703(2) when there is no written authorization.

What it held

The court held that the alleged execution of the contract by the defendant's brother did not give rise to an enforceable agreement under General Obligations Law § 5-703(2) because there was no writing authorizing the brother to execute the contract on her behalf.

In the court's words
Accordingly, the defendant established, prima facie, that the alleged execution of the contract by the defendant’s brother did not give rise to an enforceable agreement pursuant to General Obligations Law § 5-703 (2), since there was no writing authorizing the defendant’s brother to execute the contract on her behalf

42nd Avenue Commons, LLC v. Barracuda, LLC, 140 A.D.3d 1012 (2016)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether emails exchanged between the parties' attorneys satisfied the statute of frauds under General Obligations Law § 5-703(2) to create a binding contract for the sale of real property when the seller did not execute the contract and the attorney lacked written authorization.

What it held

The court held that the emails were insufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds because the defendant's attorney was not authorized in writing to bind the defendant to the contract of sale, and the parties did not intend to be bound until signing a formal contract.

In the court's words
Here, even if it were found that the defendant’s attorney subscribed the subject emails, there was no allegation in the complaint, and there was no evidence, that the defendant’s attorney had been authorized in writing to bind the defendant to the contract of sale (see Leist v Tugendhaft, 64 AD3d at 688; Nesbitt v Penalver, 40 AD3d at 599; DeMartin v Farina, 205 AD2d at 660).

Castellotti v. Free, 138 A.D.3d 198 (2016)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Does the partial performance exception under General Obligations Law § 5-703(4) apply to an oral agreement that is otherwise barred by the statute of frauds under General Obligations Law § 5-701?

What it held

The partial performance exception applies only to the statute of frauds provision in section 5-703, and has not been extended to section 5-701, so it is inapplicable here; even if some provisions involving real property could be saved by section 5-703, they are not severable from the larger agreement barred by section 5-701.

In the court's words
This Court has held, however, that the partial performance exception applies only to the statute of frauds provision in section 5-703, and has not been extended to section 5-701

Source: Caselaw Access Project, CC0 1.0 Universal (public domain dedication).

Related sections

N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-701 NY Statute of Frauds: N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-701 N.Y. General Obligations Law § 15-301 Written change requires signed writing: N.Y. GOL § 15-301 N.Y. Real Property Law § 240-c Sever Unilaterally by Deed: N.Y. Real Property Law § 240-c N.Y. Real Property Law § 442-d No license? No commission – N.Y. Real Property Law § 442-d

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We copy this text from the official publisher and re-check it against that source on every page load, but we cannot guarantee it is complete, current or free of error, and we accept no liability for any reliance on it. An amendment can take effect before a consolidation catches up. The publisher's own copy is linked below; where the two differ, it is the official one that counts.

This page reproduces the text of N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-703 in force at the date shown and explains it in general terms. It is not legal advice and takes no account of the circumstances of your case, which can change the answer completely. For a live dispute, for limitation periods, and before taking any step in court, consult a qualified lawyer in New York.

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