CA 1989 s. 31

Care & supervision order threshold: CA 1989 s. 31

Under CA 1989 s. 31, a court may make a care or supervision order if a child suffers or is likely to suffer significant harm from care or being beyond control.

Official text CA 1989 s. 31 — United Kingdom

On the application of any local authority or authorised person, the court may make an order— placing the child with respect to whom the application is made in the care of a designated local authority; or putting him under the supervision of a designated local authority . . .. A court may only make a care order or supervision order if it is satisfied— that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to— the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him; or the child’s being beyond parental control. No care order or supervision order may be made with respect to a child who has reached the age of seventeen (or sixteen, in the case of a child who is married). A court deciding whether to make a care order— is required to consider the permanence provisions of the section 31A plan for the child concerned, but is not required to consider the remainder of the section 31A plan, subject to section 34(11). For the purposes of subsection (3A), the permanence provisions of a section 31A plan are— such of the plan's provisions setting out the long-term plan for the upbringing of the child concerned as provide for any of the following— the child to live with any parent of the child's or with any other member of, or any friend of, the child's family; adoption; long-term care not within sub-paragraph (i) or (ii); such of the plan's provisions as set out any of the following— the impact on the child concerned of any harm that he or she suffered or was likely to suffer; the current and future needs of the child (including needs arising out of that impact); the way in which the long-term plan for the upbringing of the child would meet those current and future needs. The Secretary of State may by regulations amend this section for the purpose of altering what for the purposes of subsection (3A) are the permanence provisions of a section 31A plan. An application under this section may be made on its own or in any other family proceedings. The court may— on an application for a care order, make a supervision order; on an application for a supervision order, make a care order. Where an authorised person proposes to make an application under this section he shall— if it is reasonably practicable to do so; and before making the application, consult the local authority appearing to him to be the authority in whose area the child concerned is ordinarily resident. An application made by an authorised person shall not be entertained by the court if, at the time when it is made, the child concerned is— the subject of an earlier application for a care order, or supervision order, which has not been disposed of; or subject to— a care order or supervision order; a youth rehabilitation order within the meaning given by section 173 of the Sentencing Code ; or a compulsory supervision order or interim compulsory supervision order as defined by sections 83 and 86 of the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011. The local authority designated in a care order must be— the authority within whose area the child is ordinarily resident; or where the child does not reside in the area of a local authority, the authority within whose area any circumstances arose in consequence of which the order is being made. In this section— “ authorised person ” means— the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children and any of its officers; and any person authorised by order of the Secretary of State to bring proceedings under this section and any officer of a body which is so authorised; “ harm ” means ill-treatment or the impairment of health or development including, for example, impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another ; “ development ” means physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development; “ health ” means physical or mental health; and “ ill-treatment ” includes sexual abuse and forms of ill-treatment which are not physical. Where the question of whether harm suffered by a child is significant turns on the child’s health or development, his health or development shall be compared with that which could reasonably be expected of a similar child. In this Act— “ a care order ” means (subject to section 105(1 an order under subsection (1)(a) and (except where express provision to the contrary is made) includes an interim care order made under section 38; and “ a supervision order ” means an order under subsection (1)(b) and (except where express provision to the contrary is made) includes an interim supervision order made under section 38.

Text in force at .

Source: legislation.gov.uk — The National Archives (legislation.gov.uk), reproduced under licence Open Government Licence v3.0.

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What it actually says

Section 31 is the threshold provision in care proceedings and it is unusually precise about what has to be proved. A court may only make a care order or a supervision order if it is satisfied of two things: that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable either to the care given to the child, or likely to be given if the order were not made, "not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him", or to the child's being beyond parental control.

Both limbs must be satisfied. Harm alone is not enough - it has to be attributable to the standard of parental care measured against an objective standard of what it is reasonable to expect a parent to give, not against the particular parent's capabilities. And the harm must be "significant", which is not defined in the abstract; subsection (10) provides only that where the question turns on the child's health or development, that health or development is compared with what could reasonably be expected of "a similar child".

Subsection (9) defines the vocabulary: harm means ill-treatment or the impairment of health or development, expressly including impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another - which is how exposure to domestic abuse enters the threshold. Ill-treatment includes sexual abuse and non-physical forms. Development covers physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development. Subsection (3) bars any order for a child who has reached seventeen, or sixteen if married. Applications may only be brought by a local authority or an authorised person, which subsection (9) confines to the NSPCC and its officers and to persons authorised by the Secretary of State. Crossing the threshold does not produce an order: the court still applies section 1 and considers the permanence provisions of the care plan under subsection (3A).

When it applies

  • A local authority issuing care proceedings after child protection enquiries.
  • A parent disputing that the threshold criteria are met on the facts alleged.
  • Children exposed to domestic abuse between the adults in the home.
  • A teenager whose behaviour the parents say they cannot control.
  • An interim hearing where the court is deciding whether the child should be removed.

What this section does not say

  • It does not define significant harm. The only comparison the section gives is with what could reasonably be expected of a similar child, where health or development is in issue.
  • It does not allow anyone to apply. Only a local authority or an authorised person - the NSPCC or a person authorised by the Secretary of State - may bring proceedings.
  • It does not mean an order follows once the threshold is crossed. The court still applies the welfare principle and the no-order principle in section 1.
  • It does not measure the parent against their own capabilities. The comparison is with the care it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give.
  • It does not apply to children aged seventeen or over, or sixteen if married.
  • It does not set out what a care order does. That is section 33, and contact with a child in care is section 34.

Worked examples

Invented situations, written to show how the wording bites. They are not real cases, not judgments and not precedent, and nothing here predicts what would happen in yours.

Illustrative example

A local authority issues care proceedings after a period of concern about a family. The parents accept the household has been chaotic but say nothing that happened amounts to significant harm.

How the wording applies

Two limbs must both be satisfied: that the child is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm, and that the harm is attributable to the care given or likely to be given not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give, or to the child being beyond parental control. The fact that decides the second limb is the objective comparison - the standard is what it is reasonable to expect of a parent, not what these particular parents were capable of at the time.

How the parties settled it

The parents agree a written plan with the extended family covering who stays overnight, school attendance and a named relative to call, and agree to share it with the social worker rather than argue about it.

Illustrative example

Two adults in a household argue loudly and often. The children are never touched, and the adults say the children are not involved and are therefore unaffected.

How the wording applies

Subsection (9) is directly in point: harm includes impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another, which is why the 'they were never touched' answer does not dispose of it. The fact that has to be examined is what the children actually saw and heard and what effect it had - and where health or development is in issue, subsection (10) compares them with what could reasonably be expected of a similar child.

How the parties settled it

The adults agree that any argument moves out of the home, that neither raises the subject in front of the children, and that they attend a parenting programme together and tell the social worker they have done so.

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We copy this text from the official publisher and re-check it against that source on every page load, but we cannot guarantee it is complete, current or free of error, and we accept no liability for any reliance on it. An amendment can take effect before a consolidation catches up. The publisher's own copy is linked below; where the two differ, it is the official one that counts.

This page reproduces the text of CA 1989 s. 31 in force at the date shown and explains it in general terms. It is not legal advice and takes no account of the circumstances of your case, which can change the answer completely. For a live dispute, for limitation periods, and before taking any step in court, consult a qualified lawyer in England and Wales.

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