Clean Break & Spousal Maintenance: MCA 1973 s. 25A
Courts must consider ending financial obligations as soon as just and reasonable, limiting maintenance to a term allowing adjustment without undue hardship.
Official text
·
MCA 1973 s. 25A — United Kingdom
Where on or after the making of a divorce or nullity of marriage order the court decides to exercise its powers under section 23(1)(a), (b) or (c), 24 or , 24A , 24B or 24E above in favour of a party to the marriage, it shall be the duty of the court to consider whether it would be appropriate so to exercise those powers that the financial obligations of each party towards the other will be terminated as soon after the making of the order as the court considers just and reasonable. Where the court decides in such a case to make a periodical payments or secured periodical payments order in favour of a party to the marriage, the court shall in particular consider whether it would be appropriate to require those payments to be made or secured only for such term as would in the opinion of the court be sufficient to enable the party in whose favour the order is made to adjust without undue hardship to the termination of his or her financial dependence on the other party. Where on or after the making of a divorce or nullity of marriage order an application is made by a party to the marriage for a periodical payments or secured periodical payments order in his or her favour, then, if the court considers that no continuing obligation should be imposed on either party to make or secure periodical payments in favour of the other, the court may dismiss the application with a direction that the applicant shall not be entitled to make any further application in relation to that marriage for an order under section 23(1)(a) or (b) above. See also section 52A (interpretation of certain references to divorce orders, nullity of marriage orders and judicial separation orders).
Section 25A is the clean break provision, and it is framed as a duty to consider rather than a duty to impose. Where the court decides to exercise its financial powers in favour of a party after a divorce or nullity order, it must consider whether it would be appropriate to exercise them so that the financial obligations of each party towards the other "will be terminated as soon after the making of the order as the court considers just and reasonable".
Subsection (2) applies the same thinking to maintenance. Where the court decides to make a periodical payments order, it must in particular consider whether the payments should be limited to a term "sufficient to enable the party in whose favour the order is made to adjust without undue hardship to the termination of his or her financial dependence on the other party". That is the origin of the term order - maintenance for five years, or until the youngest child finishes school - and of the argument about whether the term should be extendable.
Subsection (3) is the strongest form. Where an application for periodical payments is made and the court considers that no continuing obligation should be imposed on either party, it may dismiss the application with a direction that the applicant may make no further application for periodical payments in relation to that marriage. That is a final financial separation, and it is why an order can be described as a clean break even though nothing has been paid under it. What the section does not do is create any presumption: the duty is to consider a clean break, and a court that considers it and concludes that ongoing support is required is applying the section correctly.
When it applies
A payer who wants any maintenance limited to a fixed number of years.
A recipient asking for the maintenance term to be extendable rather than fixed.
A settlement structured so that a larger capital payment removes any ongoing maintenance.
A spouse returning to work after years of caring and needing time to adjust.
A short marriage with no children where the court is asked to end all obligations at once.
What this section does not say
×It does not require a clean break. The duty is to consider one, not to impose one.
×It does not affect obligations towards children. The clean break duty is about the financial obligations of each party towards the other.
×It does not decide the amount. That is section 25.
×It does not by itself prevent a later application. A bar on further applications only arises where the court gives a direction under subsection (3), or by a section 28(1A) direction on a term order.
×It does not apply before a divorce or nullity order. The duty arises where the court exercises its powers on or after the making of such an order.
Worked examples
Invented situations, written to show how the wording bites. They are not real cases, not judgments and not precedent, and nothing here predicts what would happen in yours.
Illustrative example
One spouse is asked to pay maintenance for life. They have been told the court has to consider whether it should end at some point and want to know whether that means it will.
How the wording applies
Section 25A is framed as a duty to consider, not a duty to impose: the court must consider whether obligations can be terminated as soon after the order as is just and reasonable. Subsection (2) applies the same thinking to a term - payments limited to a period sufficient to allow adjustment without undue hardship. The fact everything turns on is whether adjustment without undue hardship is realistic on these facts, which is about the recipient's route back to independence rather than about the payer's preference.
How the parties settled it
They agree maintenance for seven years, non-extendable, with a lump sum in the final year in place of any further claim, recorded so that both know the end date from the start.
Illustrative example
A recipient is offered a fixed five-year maintenance term. They are willing to accept a term but want it capable of being extended if their planned return to work does not work out.
How the wording applies
The distinction between an extendable and a non-extendable term is the practical heart of section 25A, and it is not resolved by the section itself: a bar on further applications arises only where the court gives a direction under subsection (3), or by a section 28(1A) direction on a term order. The fact to be explicit about is therefore whether such a direction is being asked for, because a term order without one leaves the door open and a term order with one does not.
How the parties settled it
They agree a five-year term without a section 28(1A) direction, with a written understanding that no extension will be sought unless a documented health or caring change prevents the planned return to work.
Say what is happening. A neutral mediator hears your side and the other party's, and walks you both to a written agreement. In the advanced settings you can ask for the decision to be reasoned on the Acts of Parliament that apply in England and Wales.
We copy this text from the official publisher and re-check it against that source on every page load, but we cannot guarantee it is complete, current or free of error, and we accept no liability for any reliance on it. An amendment can take effect before a consolidation catches up. The publisher's own copy is linked below; where the two differ, it is the official one that counts.
This page reproduces the text of MCA 1973 s. 25A in force at the date shown and explains it in general terms. It is not legal advice and takes no account of the circumstances of your case, which can change the answer completely. For a live dispute, for limitation periods, and before taking any step in court, consult a qualified lawyer in England and Wales.