CIV § 1668

Contracts exempting liability for fraud: CIV § 1668

Civil Code § 1668 makes contracts exempting responsibility for fraud, willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law against policy.

Official text CIV § 1668 — California

All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt any one from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.

Text as published in the 2026 snapshot of the code.

Source: Vaquill Open US Law, compiled from official state publishers (huggingface.co), reproduced under license CC BY 4.0.

Read this provision at the official source →

What it actually says

Section 1668 is the outer boundary of what a contract may excuse. All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for their own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law. It applies to the object of the clause rather than to its wording, and "directly or indirectly" is there to catch the drafting that achieves the exemption by another route — a limitation of liability to a nominal sum, a waiver of remedies, a conclusive-evidence clause.

The four protected categories are not the same in scope. Fraud and willful injury to person or property are firmly within it. So is a violation of law — and the section says "whether willful or negligent", which is what makes clauses excusing statutory violations vulnerable in a way that clauses about ordinary carelessness may not be. The section does not, on its face, void every exculpatory clause for negligence; California law treats a release of ordinary negligence between private parties as capable of being valid, subject to the public interest limits developed by the courts and to specific statutes such as § 1953, which voids a residential tenant's waiver of the landlord's duty of care.

What the section provides is that the clause is against the policy of the law, which means it is not enforced; it does not follow that the whole contract falls. Section 1670.5 provides a separate route for unconscionable terms, with its own remedies. Whether a particular exclusion clause is within § 1668, is unconscionable, or is simply an allocation of risk the law permits, is the question to take to a lawyer with the contract.

When it applies

  • A contract saying the supplier is not responsible for anything, whatever happens
  • A release that purports to cover the other side's dishonesty
  • A clause excusing a business from breaching a statute that protects you
  • A waiver signed before an activity that the operator says covers everything
  • A lease clause saying the landlord has no duty of care at all
  • A limitation of liability set at a token amount

What this section does not say

  • It does not void every limitation of liability. Allocating risk for ordinary breach or ordinary negligence between private parties is not automatically within the section.
  • It does not void the whole contract. The offending object is what is against the policy of the law; the rest of the agreement is not swept away with it.
  • It is not the unconscionability doctrine. A harsh but not exculpatory term is tested under § 1670.5, which gives the court a different set of options.
  • It does not decide what happened. The section is about whether a clause can excuse conduct, not about whether the conduct occurred.
  • It does not stand alone in the tenancy context. Section 1953 separately voids a residential tenant's waiver of the landlord's statutory duty of care.

Worked examples

Invented situations, written to show how the wording bites. They are not real cases, not judgments and not precedent, and nothing here predicts what would happen in yours.

Illustrative example

A small business buys a machine after being assured in writing that it will handle a stated volume. It cannot, and the supplier points to a clause saying it accepts no liability of any kind for any loss however caused.

How the wording applies

Section 1668 voids a contract that has for its object exempting anyone from responsibility for their own fraud or willful injury. The decisive fact is what the supplier knew about the machine's capacity when it gave the assurance: an exclusion clause can allocate the risk of an ordinary failure between two businesses, but it cannot cover a statement the supplier knew to be untrue.

How the parties settled it

The supplier takes the machine back and refunds the price less an agreed sum for the months of use, and the business makes no further claim.

Illustrative example

A tenant is injured on a stairway in a building's common area. The lease contains a paragraph saying the landlord is not responsible for injury to the tenant from any cause whatsoever.

How the wording applies

A clause purporting to exempt a party from responsibility for violation of law is void under section 1668, and in a residential tenancy section 1953 separately voids a waiver of the landlord's duty of care. What the outcome turns on is not the clause at all but the condition of the stairway and who was responsible for maintaining it.

How the parties settled it

The landlord's insurer meets the medical costs, the stairway is repaired to an agreed specification by a fixed date, and the clause is removed from the lease on renewal.

How courts have read it

Decisions construing this provision. The question and the summary are ours; the quoted sentence is the court's own words, taken from the published opinion. These are the decisions in our corpus, not every decision there is, and nothing here predicts any other case. Reported 1991 to 2017.

Mundy v. Lenc, 203 Cal. App. 4th 1401 (2012)

Court of Appeal

What the court had to decide

Did the release violate Civil Code § 1668 by exempting Lene from liability for subsequent violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act?

What it held

The release did not violate Civil Code § 1668 because the parking lot violation was an existing violation, not a subsequent one.

In the court's words
If her parking lot was not ADA compliant, then it was an existing rather than a subsequent violation.

Frittelli, Inc. v. 350 North Canon Drive, LP, 202 Cal. App. 4th 35 (2011)

Court of Appeal

What the court had to decide

Did Civil Code section 1668 invalidate the liability exemption in paragraph 8.8 of the lease?

What it held

The court held that section 1668 invalidates exemptions for gross negligence, but for ordinary negligence in a commercial lease without public interest, it does not automatically invalidate the exemption; the exemption is subject to strict construction but can be valid. Here, the exemption was valid for ordinary negligence, but could not apply to gross negligence.

In the court's words
Ordinarily, the statute invalidates contracts that purport to exempt an individual or entity from liability for future intentional wrongs (Farnham v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 69, 74 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 85]) and gross negligence (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 777).

Caza Drilling (California), Inc. v. Teg Oil & Gas U.S.A., Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 453 (2006)

Court of Appeal

What the court had to decide

Whether Civil Code section 1668 invalidates the exculpatory and limitation of liability provisions in the parties' drilling contract.

What it held

The court held that the contractual provisions represented a valid limitation on liability rather than a complete exemption from responsibility, and that appellants failed to identify a specific law or regulation violated, so section 1668 did not invalidate the provisions.

In the court's words
We conclude that the contractual provisions represented a valid limitation on liability rather than a complete exemption from responsibility, and that, in any event, appellants have failed in their repeated efforts to identify a specific law or regulation potentially violated by CAZA.

Capri v. L.A. Fitness International, LLC, 136 Cal. App. 4th 1078 (2006)

Court of Appeal

What the court had to decide

Whether the waiver and release clause in a health club membership agreement is invalid under Civil Code section 1668 as to a cause of action for negligence per se based on violation of law.

What it held

The exculpatory clause is invalid under section 1668 as to the second cause of action for negligence per se because it seeks to exempt the defendant from responsibility for violation of law, and the Tunkl public interest requirement does not apply to such statutory violations.

In the court's words
We conclude that the exculpatory clause in the membership agreement is invalid under section 1668 as to appellant’s second cause of action for negligence per se.

Health Net of California, Inc. v. Department of Health Services, 113 Cal. App. 4th 224 (2003)

Court of Appeal

What the court had to decide

Does Civil Code section 1668 invalidate a contractual clause that prohibits any recovery of damages for any violation of statutory or regulatory law not made part of the parties' contractual obligations?

What it held

Yes, section 1668 prevents a party from imposing such a contractual prohibition against the recovery of damages for any future violations of statutory or regulatory law, regardless of whether the public interest is affected.

In the court's words
Based on the clear intent of section 1668, as expressed in its plain language, and consistent with the case law, we find that section 1668 prevents a party from imposing such a contractual prohibition against the recovery of damages for any future violations of statutory or regulatory law.

Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 1064 (2003)

Supreme Court of California

What the court had to decide

Does Civil Code section 1668 render claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy unwaivable in arbitration?

What it held

Yes, the court held that Civil Code section 1668 supports the unwaivability of Tameny claims, and therefore arbitration of such claims must satisfy the Armendariz requirements.

In the court's words
A Tameny claim is almost by definition unwaivable.

Source: Caselaw Access Project, CC0 1.0 Universal (public domain dedication).

Related sections

CIV § 1670.5 Courts May Refuse Unconscionable Contracts - CIV § 1670.5 CIV § 1572 Actual fraud: 5 types under California CIV § 1572 CIV § 1953 Certain tenant waivers in leases are void: CIV § 1953 CIV § 1671 Liquidated damages valid unless unreasonable - CIV § 1671

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We copy this text from the official publisher and re-check it against that source on every page load, but we cannot guarantee it is complete, current or free of error, and we accept no liability for any reliance on it. An amendment can take effect before a consolidation catches up. The publisher's own copy is linked below; where the two differ, it is the official one that counts.

This page reproduces the text of CIV § 1668 in force at the date shown and explains it in general terms. It is not legal advice and takes no account of the circumstances of your case, which can change the answer completely. For a live dispute, for limitation periods, and before taking any step in court, consult a qualified lawyer in California.

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