California Civil Code § 3482 - The defence that a statute authorised it

Section 3482 takes out of the definition of nuisance only what is done or maintained under the express authority of a statute. The fact this turns on is the difference between a statute expressly authorising the activity and an administrative permit allowing it subject to conditions: the second is not the first, and compliance with limits is evidence rather than a defence.

The plant agrees a night-time curfew on the noisiest operation, commissions a noise survey with the residents' input, and implements the mitigation it recommends on an agreed timetable.

Even where an activity is authorised, the section does not protect the manner in which it is carried on, so negligent or unnecessarily intrusive performance is not answered by the authority. It hinges on the drainage detail rather than the approval, because the consent was for a building and not for discharging water next door.

The neighbour reroutes the downpipe and installs a soakaway to an agreed specification, and pays for making good the saturated ground.

Whether Civil Code section 3482, which provides that nothing done or maintained under the express authority of a statute can be deemed a nuisance, bars a common law nuisance claim for pesticide drift when the pesticide application was conducted pursuant to permits and in compliance with the pesticide laws.

The court held that Civil Code section 3482 does not bar the nuisance cause of action because the statutory scheme governing pesticides does not displace common law nuisance claims and leaves ample room for such claims.

We also find that the negligence and trespass causes of action were not barred by an administrative determination that defendant had complied with the pesticide laws, that the trial court did not err by instructing the jury in the doctrine of negligence per se, and that Civil Code section 3482 does not bar the nuisance cause of action.

Whether a city can avoid nuisance liability for leasing a public street for private commercial use if the lease is purportedly authorized by a statute, in light of Civil Code section 3482.

The court held that the immunity provided by Civil Code section 3482 is circumscribed and applies only when the statute expressly authorizes the very act that causes the injury, requiring courts to scrutinize whether the legislature intended to sanction the nuisance.

Courts must scrutinize the statutes in question to ascertain whether a legislative intent exists to sanction a nuisance.

Whether the discharge of treated wastewater under a permit issued pursuant to statute constitutes an express statutory authority that precludes nuisance liability under Civil Code section 3482.

The discharge of treated wastewater under a valid NPDES permit is done under express statutory authority and therefore cannot be deemed a nuisance under Civil Code section 3482.

Even though the discharge from the treatment facility performed as authorized by statute and permit may contribute to the growth of the vegetation, appellants cannot obtain relief by enjoining these respondents.

Did Civil Code section 3482 bar a nuisance claim against the city because the city expressly permitted ice-cream trucks to operate on its streets?

Yes. Because San Diego Municipal Code section 54.0122 expressly permitted ice-cream truck sales on city streets, that authorized conduct could not be deemed a nuisance under Civil Code section 3482, so the plaintiffs' nuisance claim failed.

Because operation of ice-cream trucks on the city’s streets is specifically permitted by Municipal Code section 54.0122, such permission cannot give rise to a nuisance.