Nuisance defined: harm to health or property | CIV § 3479

Section 3479 covers anything offensive to the senses or interfering with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, tested objectively rather than by the complainant's sensitivity. What the outcome turns on is duration and timing rather than volume alone, since an hour on a weekday afternoon and a run from early morning to late evening are different facts under the same words. The section sets no decibel limits, which come from local ordinances instead.

The generator is moved away from the shared wall and housed in an acoustic enclosure, and its use is confined to agreed hours on weekdays.

Smell is squarely within the words offensive to the senses, and the fact this hinges on is the position and height of the flue rather than the cooking itself. A permit or a licence for the restaurant does not answer the claim, because section 3482 requires the express authority of a statute, which an operating permit is not.

The restaurant extends and redirects the flue to an agreed specification within a fixed period and services the filters monthly, and the residents agree to raise any further complaint in writing first.

The claim is about interference with the comfortable enjoyment of the neighbouring property, which does not depend on the dog being anywhere it should not be. It turns on the pattern, meaning how long, how often and at what hours, recorded as it happens, because a dated log is the difference between a nuisance claim and an assertion of annoyance.

The owner arranges a midday walk and daytime company for the dog and brings it indoors before an agreed hour, and the neighbours keep a shared log for a trial period.

Did the trial court err by instructing the jury on the common law definition of public nuisance under Civil Code section 3479 as additional elements for a statutory public nuisance claim under Civil Code section 798.87?

The trial court erred by adding elements of a common law public nuisance (as defined in Civil Code section 3479) to the statutory public nuisance created by Civil Code section 798.87, but the error was not prejudicial.

Therefore, we agree with plaintiffs that the instructions and the special verdict form for public nuisance contained legal error in that they added elements of a common law public nuisance to the two types of public nuisance created by subdivisions (a) and (b) of Civil Code section 798.87.

Does the illegal sale of controlled substances at a storefront business establish a public nuisance under Civil Code section 3479?

The illegal sale of controlled substances at Orgánica's premises constituted a nuisance per se under Civil Code section 3479, as the statute expressly includes such activity.

Such violations constitute nuisances per se under Civil Code section 3479.

Whether the trial court erred in denying class certification for a nuisance cause of action under Civil Code section 3479.

The trial court did not err; its denial of class certification was proper because common questions did not predominate and individual issues of special injury required individualized proof.

We determine that the trial court used appropriate factual criteria and legal assumptions in ruling on the certification motion and affirm for the following reasons.

Whether the gang activities described in the complaint fall within the statutory definition of a public nuisance under Civil Code section 3479.

The court held that the gang activities constitute a public nuisance within the statutory definition, but emphasized that the courts lack power to extend the definition beyond what the Legislature has enacted.

the ultimate legal authority to declare a given act or condition a public nuisance rests with the Legislature; the courts lack power to extend the definition of the wrong or to grant equitable relief against conduct not reasonably within the ambit of the statutory definition of a public nuisance

Whether the subsurface contamination of Beck's property constituted a nuisance under Civil Code section 3479.

The court reversed the judgment against Southern Pacific, effectively holding that the nuisance claim was not viable, likely because the nuisance was permanent and the statute of limitations had expired.

Finally, we shall reverse the judgment in favor of Beck and against Southern Pacific and remand with directions to enter judgment in favor of Southern Pacific.

Whether the broad statutory definition of nuisance in Civil Code section 3479 allows recovery for a defective product under a nuisance cause of action.

The court held that nuisance is not an appropriate theory for recovery for a defective product like asbestos; the city's claim was essentially a products liability action, not a nuisance action.

City cites no California decision, however, that allows recovery for a defective product under a nuisance cause of action.