CIV § 47

Litigation & common interest privilege CIV § 47

CIV § 47 lists privileges: judicial/official proceedings, common interest (including employer references & sexual harassment complaints), and fair reports.

Official text CIV § 47 — California

A privileged publication or broadcast is one made:

  • (a) In the proper discharge of an official duty.
  • (b) In any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except as follows:
  • (1) An allegation or averment contained in any pleading or affidavit filed in an action for marital dissolution or legal separation made of or concerning a person by or against whom no affirmative relief is prayed in the action shall not be a privileged publication or broadcast as to the person making the allegation or averment within the meaning of this section unless the pleading is verified or affidavit sworn to, and is made without malice, by one having reasonable and probable cause for believing the truth of the allegation or averment and unless the allegation or averment is material and relevant to the issues in the action.
  • (2) This subdivision does not make privileged any communication made in furtherance of an act of intentional destruction or alteration of physical evidence undertaken for the purpose of depriving a party to litigation of the use of that evidence, whether or not the content of the communication is the subject of a subsequent publication or broadcast which is privileged pursuant to this section. As used in this paragraph, “physical evidence” means evidence specified in Section 250 of the Evidence Code or evidence that is property of any type specified in Chapter 14 (commencing with Section 2031.010) of Title 4 of Part 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • (3) This subdivision does not make privileged any communication made in a judicial proceeding knowingly concealing the existence of an insurance policy or policies.
  • (4) A recorded lis pendens is not a privileged publication unless it identifies an action previously filed with a court of competent jurisdiction which affects the title or right of possession of real property, as authorized or required by law.
  • (5) This subdivision does not make privileged any communication between a person and a law enforcement agency in which the person makes a false report that another person has committed, or is in the act of committing, a criminal act or is engaged in an activity requiring law enforcement intervention, knowing that the report is false, or with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the report.
  • (c) In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the information. This subdivision applies to and includes a communication concerning the job performance or qualifications of an applicant for employment, based upon credible evidence, made without malice, by a current or former employer of the applicant to, and upon request of, one whom the employer reasonably believes is a prospective employer of the applicant. This subdivision applies to and includes a complaint of sexual harassment by an employee, without malice, to an employer based upon credible evidence and communications between the employer and interested persons, without malice, regarding a complaint of sexual harassment. This subdivision authorizes a current or former employer, or the employer’s agent, to answer, without malice, whether or not the employer would rehire a current or former employee and whether the decision to not rehire is based upon the employer’s determination that the former employee engaged in sexual harassment. This subdivision does not apply to a communication concerning the speech or activities of an applicant for employment if the speech or activities are constitutionally protected, or otherwise protected by Section 527.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure or any other provision of law.
  • (d) (1) By a fair and true report in, or a communication to, a public journal, of (A) a judicial, (B) legislative, or (C) other public official proceeding, or (D) of anything said in the course thereof, or (E) of a verified charge or complaint made by any person to a public official, upon which complaint a warrant has been issued.
  • (2) Paragraph (1) does not make privileged any communication to a public journal that does any of the following: (A) Violates Rule 3.6 of the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct. (B) Breaches a court order. (C) Violates a requirement of confidentiality imposed by law.
  • (e) By a fair and true report of (1) the proceedings of a public meeting, if the meeting was lawfully convened for a lawful purpose and open to the public, or (2) the publication of the matter complained of was for the public benefit.

Text as published in the 2026 snapshot of the code.

Source: Vaquill Open US Law, compiled from official state publishers (huggingface.co), reproduced under license CC BY 4.0.

Read this provision at the official source →

What it actually says

Section 47 is the reason a great many apparently defamatory statements produce no claim. It lists the publications that are privileged, and because § 45 and § 46 define libel and slander as "false and unprivileged", a privileged statement is not defamation at all rather than defamation with an excuse.

Subdivision (b) is the litigation privilege and it is the broadest: statements made in a legislative proceeding, a judicial proceeding, any other official proceeding authorised by law, or in the initiation or course of a reviewable proceeding. It covers pleadings, declarations, complaints to authorities and communications preparatory to litigation, and it is absolute — malice does not defeat it. The subdivision then sets out its own narrow exceptions: certain unverified allegations about a non-party in a marital dissolution or separation, communications furthering the destruction or alteration of physical evidence, communications concealing the existence of an insurance policy, a recorded lis pendens not identifying a qualifying filed action, and a knowingly false report to a law enforcement agency that someone has committed a crime.

Subdivision (c) is the common interest privilege and it is conditional: a communication without malice to a person interested in it, by one who is also interested, or who stands in a relation affording reasonable ground to suppose the motive innocent, or who was asked by the interested person for the information. The subdivision expressly extends to a former or current employer answering, on request and without malice and on credible evidence, about a job applicant's performance or qualifications, and to complaints of sexual harassment made without malice on credible evidence. Because subdivision (c) falls away where there is malice, most fights about it are fights about motive. Whether a statement is privileged, and under which subdivision, is one of the first questions a lawyer will look at.

When it applies

  • A false allegation made in a court filing or a declaration
  • A reference given by a former employer that cost you the job
  • A report made to a licensing body, a regulator or a public agency
  • An internal complaint circulated among managers
  • A statement made in the course of a dispute that later becomes the thing complained of
  • A false report to the police that someone committed a crime

What this section does not say

  • It is not a general protection for saying what you believe. Subdivision (c) requires the recipient to be interested and the statement to be made without malice; a broadcast to the world is not within it.
  • It does not protect a knowingly false crime report. Paragraph (5) of subdivision (b) expressly removes that from the judicial-proceedings privilege.
  • It does not shield conduct, only publications. The privilege attaches to statements; it does not immunise the underlying acts they describe or accompany.
  • The employment reference privilege is conditional. It applies to an answer given on request, without malice and based on credible evidence, not to volunteering damaging claims about a former employee.
  • It is not confined to defamation in every respect. Courts have applied the litigation privilege beyond defamation, and its scope is a question of case law rather than of this list.

Worked examples

Invented situations, written to show how the wording bites. They are not real cases, not judgments and not precedent, and nothing here predicts what would happen in yours.

Illustrative example

A job offer is withdrawn after a reference from a former employer describes performance problems the candidate disputes.

How the wording applies

Subdivision (c) privileges a communication, without malice, to a person interested in it, and expressly covers a former employer's answer about job performance where the reference was requested. It turns on malice rather than on accuracy: a fair if unflattering answer to a request is privileged, and a statement made to damage the person, or volunteered to people who never asked, is not.

How the parties settled it

The former employer agrees to give a factual reference limited to dates and role in future, and the candidate makes no further claim.

Illustrative example

A false allegation about someone's conduct appears in a declaration filed in a court case, and is then repeated by the same person in a social media post.

How the wording applies

The litigation privilege in subdivision (b) covers publications made in a judicial proceeding, which is why the declaration itself generally produces no claim however damaging it is. The fact that decides this is the second publication: repeating the allegation outside the proceeding, to an audience with no interest in it, is not within the privilege.

How the parties settled it

The post is deleted and not repeated, the parties agree that anything relevant is raised only in the proceeding, and no separate claim is brought over the filing.

How courts have read it

Decisions construing this provision. The question and the summary are ours; the quoted sentence is the court's own words, taken from the published opinion. These are the decisions in our corpus, not every decision there is, and nothing here predicts any other case. Reported 1991 to 2017.

Argentieri v. Zuckerberg, 8 Cal. App. 5th 768 (2017)

Court of Appeal

What the court had to decide

Whether the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) applies to a statement made by a party's general counsel to the press about pending litigation.

What it held

The litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) does not apply to a statement made to the press about pending litigation, because such a statement is not made in a judicial proceeding or to achieve the objects of the litigation.

In the court's words
Although the statement underlying Argentieri’s defamation claim was not subject to the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), it was subject to the fair and true reporting privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d).

Lemke v. Sutter Roseville Medical Center, 8 Cal. App. 5th 1292 (2017)

Court of Appeal

What the court had to decide

Whether Sutter Roseville's statements to the Board of Registered Nursing were absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).

What it held

Statements made to the Board of Registered Nursing to report nursing misconduct are absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), barring the defamation claim even if made in bad faith.

In the court's words
Statements made to the Board to report nursing misconduct are absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).

Healthsmart Pacific, Inc. v. Kabateck, 7 Cal. App. 5th 416 (2016)

Court of Appeal

What the court had to decide

Whether the statements made by the attorney defendants in television and radio interviews about a pending lawsuit are protected under the fair report privilege of Civil Code §47.

What it held

The court held that the challenged statements are protected under the fair report privilege, and therefore plaintiffs failed to establish a probability of success on the merits.

In the court's words
we conclude that the action arises out of activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute and, because the challenged statements are protected under the fair report privilege, plaintiffs have not established a probability of success on the merits of their claims.

McNair v. City & County of San Francisco, 5 Cal. App. 5th 1154 (2016)

Court of Appeal

What the court had to decide

Whether Civil Code section 47(b)'s litigation privilege barred McNair's intentional tort and breach of contract claims arising from Dr. Kim's letter to the DMV.

What it held

The litigation privilege under section 47(b) barred both the intentional tort and breach of contract claims, so the trial court's judgment was affirmed.

In the court's words
Because we conclude that both of McNair’s claims were barred by the litigation privilege, we affirm.

Contreras v. Dowling, 5 Cal. App. 5th 394 (2016)

Court of Appeal

What the court had to decide

Whether Dowling's communicative acts as an attorney representing clients in pending litigation are protected by the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).

What it held

The court held that Dowling's communicative acts are within the scope of the litigation privilege codified in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), providing a complete defense, and thus Contreras cannot demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits.

In the court's words
Moreover, Contreras cannot demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of her cause of action, because Dowling’s communicative acts are within the scope of the litigation privilege codified in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).

Greco v. Greco, 2 Cal. App. 5th 810 (2016)

Court of Appeal

What the court had to decide

Whether the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) bars Cara Lyn's claims against Clyde Jr. for taking trust and estate funds to fund litigation.

What it held

The litigation privilege does not bar Cara Lyn's claims because the gravamen of her claims is the wrongful taking of funds, not the litigation itself, and Clyde Jr. has not shown the statements about the litigation are covered by the privilege.

In the court's words
While Clyde Jr.’s statements about the litigahon are protected activity, Clyde Jr. has not shown it is covered by the lihgation privilege.

Source: Caselaw Access Project, CC0 1.0 Universal (public domain dedication).

Related sections

CIV § 45 Libel defined: false unprivileged publication (CIV § 45) CIV § 46 Slander Definition: 5 Categories | CIV § 46

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We copy this text from the official publisher and re-check it against that source on every page load, but we cannot guarantee it is complete, current or free of error, and we accept no liability for any reliance on it. An amendment can take effect before a consolidation catches up. The publisher's own copy is linked below; where the two differ, it is the official one that counts.

This page reproduces the text of CIV § 47 in force at the date shown and explains it in general terms. It is not legal advice and takes no account of the circumstances of your case, which can change the answer completely. For a live dispute, for limitation periods, and before taking any step in court, consult a qualified lawyer in California.

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