Section 46 defines slander as a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered — and also communications by radio or any mechanical or other means — that falls within one of five numbered categories. Unlike libel, spoken defamation is not actionable simply because it lowers someone's reputation; it has to fit the list.
The categories are: charging a person with a crime, or with having been indicted, convicted or punished for one; imputing the present existence of an infectious, contagious or loathsome disease; tending directly to injure the person in respect of their office, profession, trade or business, either by imputing a general disqualification in the respects the occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something about the occupation that naturally tends to lessen its profits; imputing impotence or want of chastity; and — the fifth and quite different one — any statement which by natural consequence causes actual damage.
The first four are the historic categories where the law presumes damage; the fifth admits everything else on condition that actual damage is proved. That structure is what makes the third category the workhorse of modern claims: statements about someone's competence or honesty at work fall within it and do not require proof of a specific loss. As with libel, falsity and absence of privilege are built into the definition rather than added as defences, so a substantially true statement is not slander and a statement covered by § 47 is not slander. Note the drafting of "orally uttered, and also communications by radio or any mechanical or other means", which is where broadcast and recorded speech sit. Whether a spoken statement fits a category, and whether it was privileged, are questions to take to a lawyer.