N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 248

Maintenance ends on remarriage – N.Y. DRL §248

Under N.Y. DRL §248, maintenance ends when the payee remarries. It may end if the payee cohabits while holding out as a spouse.

Official text N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 248 — New York

§ 248. Modification of judgment or order in action for divorce or annulment. Where an action for divorce or for annulment or for a declaration of the nullity of a void marriage is brought by a spouse, and a final judgment of divorce or a final judgment annulling the marriage or declaring its nullity has been rendered, the court, by order upon the application of the payor on notice, and on proof of the marriage of the payee after such final judgment, must modify such final judgment and any orders made with respect thereto by annulling the provisions of such final judgment or orders, or of both, directing payments of money for the support of the payee. The court in its discretion upon application of the payor on notice, upon proof that the payee is habitually living with another person and holding himself or herself out as the spouse of such other person, although not married to such other person, may modify such final judgment and any orders made with respect thereto by annulling the provisions of such final judgment or orders or of both, directing payment of money for the support of such payee.

Text as published in the 2026 snapshot of the code.

Source: Vaquill Open US Law, compiled from official state publishers (huggingface.co), reproduced under license CC BY 4.0.

Read this provision at the official source →

What it actually says

Two rules, one mandatory and one discretionary, and the difference between them is the whole section. On the payor's application on notice, and on proof that the payee married after the final judgment of divorce, annulment or nullity, the court "must" modify the judgment by annulling the provisions directing payments for the payee's support. Remarriage ends maintenance, and the court has no discretion about it - though the section still requires an application, so payments are not extinguished automatically by the fact of the wedding.

The second rule is different in every respect. On the payor's application on notice, and on proof that the payee is habitually living with another person and holding himself or herself out as the spouse of that other person - although not married to them - the court "may" annul the support provisions. Two elements are required, not one: habitual living together, and holding out as spouses. Cohabitation alone, however long and however financially intertwined, does not satisfy the text as written, and even where both elements are proved the court retains discretion.

The section reaches provisions directing payment of money for the support of the payee. It has nothing to say about child support, which is a separate obligation to the children and is not affected by a former spouse's remarriage or cohabitation.

When it applies

  • A former spouse receiving maintenance remarries and the payor wants the payments to stop.
  • A payor discovers the payee has been living with a partner for years.
  • A payee's new relationship is disputed as to whether the couple hold themselves out as spouses.
  • A payor stops paying on hearing of a remarriage without applying to the court.
  • Parties negotiating a settlement want to know what will end maintenance.

What this section does not say

  • It does not end child support. The section addresses payments for the support of the payee.
  • It does not operate by itself. Even on remarriage, the court acts on the payor's application on notice.
  • It does not make cohabitation enough. Holding out as spouses is a separate element, and the remedy remains discretionary.
  • It does not deal with modification for changed circumstances generally, which arises under other provisions.
  • It does not cancel arrears accrued before the application, which are dealt with under § 244.

Worked examples

Invented situations, written to show how the wording bites. They are not real cases, not judgments and not precedent, and nothing here predicts what would happen in yours.

Illustrative example

A payor learns that the former spouse receiving maintenance has lived with a partner for three years, shares the bills with him, and introduces him as her husband at work events.

How the wording applies

Cohabitation alone does not satisfy the text however long it has run or however tangled the finances: the section requires habitual living with another person and holding out as that person's spouse, and even with both established the court may annul the support provisions rather than must. So the case rests on the holding-out element, which is about how the couple present themselves rather than how they split the rent.

How the parties settled it

Maintenance steps down over twelve months to nothing, which spares both of them an argument about what holding out means in front of anyone else.

Illustrative example

A payee remarries. The payor hears about it from a mutual friend, cancels the standing order that month, and assumes the obligation ended on the wedding day.

How the wording applies

On proof of remarriage the court must annul the provisions directing payments for the payee's support - there is no discretion. But the section operates on the payor's application on notice, so whether the skipped months count as arrears turns on whether an application was made, not on the date of the wedding.

How the parties settled it

They agree payments stop as of the remarriage date and that neither pursues the two months in between, in exchange for the application being made promptly and unopposed.

Illustrative example

Two spouses drafting maintenance terms cannot agree on what should end the payments. One wants them to stop if the other ever lives with a partner; the other says their private life is nobody's business.

How the wording applies

The default the section supplies is narrow - remarriage ends maintenance; cohabitation ends it only where there is also a holding out as spouses, and then only if the court exercises its discretion. Their disagreement turns on whether they want that default or a trigger of their own writing, because nothing stops them agreeing something different.

How the parties settled it

They keep the statutory position and add one term of their own: a review of the amount if either household's income changes substantially, so that neither has any reason to monitor the other's relationships.

How courts have read it

Decisions construing this provision. The question and the summary are ours; the quoted sentence is the court's own words, taken from the published opinion. These are the decisions in our corpus, not every decision there is, and nothing here predicts any other case. Reported 2003 to 2017.

Burns v. Burns, 56 Misc. 3d 864 (2017)

trial courts

What the court had to decide

Does a contractual obligation to pay maintenance survive the remarriage of the payee when the parties' opting out agreement does not contain a cutoff upon remarriage?

What it held

The court held that under DOM § 248 and the public policy of New York, maintenance automatically terminates upon remarriage, and the parties cannot opt out of that provision unless the agreement specifically references section 248.

In the court's words
the public policy of New York, articulated by the Domestic Relations Law, does not permit maintenance to be paid after remarriage of the recipient spouse.

Gillman v. Gillman, 139 A.D.3d 667 (2016)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Should the duration of a maintenance award be subject to termination upon the payee's remarriage or cohabitation under Domestic Relations Law § 248, rather than a fixed age?

What it held

The court held that the maintenance award should terminate upon the earliest of the plaintiff's eligibility for full Social Security retirement benefits, her remarriage, her cohabitation pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 248, or the death of either party, rather than at a fixed age.

In the court's words
the duration of the plaintiff’s maintenance should be until the earliest of her eligibility for full Social Security retirement benefits, her remarriage or cohabitation pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 248, or the death of either party

D'Iorio v. D'Iorio, 135 A.D.3d 693 (2016)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Under Domestic Relations Law § 248, should the duration of a maintenance award be fixed at a specific term or should it terminate upon the earliest of certain events including remarriage or cohabitation?

What it held

The duration of the defendant's maintenance should be until the earliest of her eligibility for full Social Security retirement benefits, her remarriage or cohabitation pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 248, or the death of either party, not a fixed eight-year term.

In the court's words
Accordingly, the duration of the defendant’s maintenance should be until the earliest of her eligibility for full Social Security retirement benefits, her remarriage or cohabitation pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 248, or the death of either party

Mastrocovo v. Capizzi, 87 A.D.3d 1296 (2011)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Did the parties' agreement to terminate maintenance upon 'continued cohabitation' require proof both of cohabitation and of holding oneself out as the other's spouse, as Domestic Relations Law § 248 provides?

What it held

The court held that the agreement required only proof of cohabitation, not the additional element of holding out as a spouse, because the reference to § 248 was solely to define cohabitation and the express mention of only one prong excluded the other.

In the court's words
We conclude that the court erred in denying the order to show cause with respect to maintenance because defendant was required to prove only that plaintiff cohabitated with another man.

Florio v. Florio, 25 A.D.3d 947 (2006)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether the trial court's condition that maintenance cease upon cohabitation with an unrelated male satisfied Domestic Relations Law § 248, which requires both cohabitation and holding oneself out as a spouse.

What it held

The court held that under Domestic Relations Law § 248, mere cohabitation is insufficient; the statute requires proof of both cohabitation and holding oneself out as the spouse of the other person.

In the court's words
as the case law on this point plainly requires that both elements of the statute be established and, further, that mere cohabitation is insufficient

Source: Caselaw Access Project, CC0 1.0 Universal (public domain dedication).

Related sections

N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 244 DRL § 244: turning unpaid support into an enforceable money judgment N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 241 DRL § 241: withholding visitation can suspend maintenance - but never child support N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 170 DRL § 170: the seven grounds for divorce in New York N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-311 Void Support Waivers: N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-311

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We copy this text from the official publisher and re-check it against that source on every page load, but we cannot guarantee it is complete, current or free of error, and we accept no liability for any reliance on it. An amendment can take effect before a consolidation catches up. The publisher's own copy is linked below; where the two differ, it is the official one that counts.

This page reproduces the text of N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 248 in force at the date shown and explains it in general terms. It is not legal advice and takes no account of the circumstances of your case, which can change the answer completely. For a live dispute, for limitation periods, and before taking any step in court, consult a qualified lawyer in New York.

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