N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-311

Void Support Waivers: N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-311

N.Y. GOL § 5-311 voids agreements between husband and wife to alter or dissolve marriage, or to waive support if a spouse becomes a public charge.

Official text N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-311 — New York

§ 5-311. Certain agreements between husband and wife void. Except as provided in section two hundred thirty-six of the domestic relations law, a husband and wife cannot contract to alter or dissolve the marriage or to relieve either of his or her liability to support the other in such a manner that he or she will become incapable of self-support and therefore is likely to become a public charge. An agreement, heretofore or hereafter made between a husband and wife, shall not be considered a contract to alter or dissolve the marriage unless it contains an express provision requiring the dissolution of the marriage or provides for the procurement of grounds of divorce.

Text as published in the 2026 snapshot of the code.

Source: Vaquill Open US Law, compiled from official state publishers (huggingface.co), reproduced under license CC BY 4.0.

Read this provision at the official source →

What it actually says

The section states one prohibition and then narrows it sharply. Except as provided in Domestic Relations Law § 236, a husband and wife cannot contract to alter or dissolve the marriage, or to relieve either of the liability to support the other in such a manner that he or she will become incapable of self-support and therefore is likely to become a public charge.

The support limb is narrower than it first reads. It is not that spouses cannot agree about support - § 236 expressly permits agreements about maintenance and property, and the opening words defer to it. What cannot be done is to strip support away to the point where the spouse cannot support themselves and is likely to fall on the public purse. The state's interest, not the spouse's, is what the limb protects.

The second sentence answers the question that otherwise swallows every separation agreement. An agreement between husband and wife is not to be considered a contract to alter or dissolve the marriage unless it contains an express provision requiring the dissolution of the marriage or providing for the procurement of grounds of divorce. So an ordinary separation agreement, however comprehensively it settles the parties' affairs, is not void under this section; a clause obliging a spouse to obtain a divorce, or to manufacture grounds for one, is a different matter.

When it applies

  • A separation agreement waives spousal support entirely and one spouse has no means.
  • A prenuptial or postnuptial agreement is challenged as an attempt to contract about the marriage itself.
  • An agreement contains a clause requiring one party to file for divorce.
  • Spouses want to settle their affairs privately without dissolving the marriage.
  • A party argues that an agreement dealing with support is void as a matter of public policy.

What this section does not say

  • It does not void separation agreements. The second sentence expressly says an agreement is not a contract to alter or dissolve the marriage unless it requires dissolution or the procurement of grounds.
  • It does not forbid agreements about maintenance and property. Domestic Relations Law § 236 governs those and the section defers to it.
  • It does not void every waiver of support - only one that would leave a spouse incapable of self-support and likely to become a public charge.
  • It does not set out how a marital agreement must be executed, or when it may be set aside for other reasons.
  • It does not apply to unmarried couples.

Worked examples

Invented situations, written to show how the wording bites. They are not real cases, not judgments and not precedent, and nothing here predicts what would happen in yours.

Illustrative example

One spouse is asked to sign an agreement waiving support entirely. They have no earnings of their own, a long-standing health condition and no realistic prospect of work.

How the wording applies

The prohibition is narrower than it first reads. What cannot be done is to relieve a spouse of the liability to support the other in such a manner that the other becomes incapable of self-support and is therefore likely to become a public charge; agreements about maintenance and property are permitted by Domestic Relations Law § 236, to which the opening words defer. It turns on the effect of the waiver on that spouse's ability to support themselves, not on the fact that a waiver was asked for.

How the parties settled it

They replace the blanket waiver with a modest fixed sum for a defined number of years, which both of them prefer to a clause either could attack later.

Illustrative example

An agreement put in front of a spouse contains a clause obliging them to file for divorce within a year of signing. They are willing to settle their affairs but do not want to be committed to filing anything.

How the wording applies

The second sentence is what saves ordinary separation agreements: an agreement between spouses is not a contract to alter or dissolve the marriage unless it contains an express provision requiring dissolution or providing for the procurement of grounds for divorce. This clause is exactly that, so the whole question turns on the presence of that provision rather than on anything else in the document.

How the parties settled it

They strike the filing clause and keep the rest, agreeing instead that either of them may file whenever they choose and that neither will treat the other's filing as a breach.

Illustrative example

Years after signing a full separation agreement, one party wants out of it and argues the whole document was void from the start because spouses cannot contract about their marriage.

How the wording applies

The section says the opposite for an ordinary agreement: however comprehensively it settles the parties' affairs, it is not a contract to alter or dissolve the marriage unless it expressly requires dissolution or the procurement of grounds. The argument turns on whether any such express provision appears in the document, which is a matter of reading it rather than of how much ground it covered.

How the parties settled it

They agree the agreement stands and put their effort into the single clause that has genuinely stopped working - the one about the car - replacing it with a term both can live with now.

How courts have read it

Decisions construing this provision. The question and the summary are ours; the quoted sentence is the court's own words, taken from the published opinion. These are the decisions in our corpus, not every decision there is, and nothing here predicts any other case. Reported 2003 to 2017.

Barocas v. Barocas, 94 A.D.3d 551 (2012)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether the waiver of spousal support in a prenuptial agreement is void under GOB § 5-311 because the spouse would become a public charge.

What it held

The court held that factual issues exist as to whether the waiver of spousal support would be unconscionable as applied to present circumstances, including whether the wife would become a public charge, and thus summary judgment was properly denied.

In the court's words
and it is unclear whether defendant would become a public charge without spousal support (see Cron, 8 AD3d at 187; see also Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [3] [3]; General Obligations Law § 5-311; Bloomfield, 97 NY2d at 194).

Webb v. Webb, 18 Misc. 3d 822 (2007)

trial courts

What the court had to decide

whether the prenuptial agreement constitutes a contract to dissolve marriage void under GOB § 5-311

What it held

The court held that the prenuptial agreement does not contain an express provision requiring the dissolution of the marriage, and therefore it is not a contract to alter or dissolve the marriage within the scope of GOB § 5-311.

In the court's words
While a contractual term expressly requiring the dissolution of marriage may nevertheless be invalid, even if contained in an agreement that otherwise complies with Domestic Relations Law § 236 (see Taft v Taft, 156 AD2d 444, 445 [1989]), the parties’ prenuptial agreement contains no such clause.

Source: Caselaw Access Project, CC0 1.0 Universal (public domain dedication).

Related sections

N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 234 DRL § 234: who stays in the house while the divorce runs N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 170 DRL § 170: the seven grounds for divorce in New York N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 200 DRL § 200: the grounds for a judgment of separation in New York N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-701 NY Statute of Frauds: N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-701

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This page reproduces the text of N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-311 in force at the date shown and explains it in general terms. It is not legal advice and takes no account of the circumstances of your case, which can change the answer completely. For a live dispute, for limitation periods, and before taking any step in court, consult a qualified lawyer in New York.

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