GOL § 15-108: settling with one of several wrongdoers

Subdivision (a) says the opposite: a release given to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury does not discharge the others unless its terms expressly so provide. So the question is entirely about the wording of the paper that was signed, because the statute preserves the claim only where the release did not itself release everybody.

Both sides agree to read the signed release together line by line before going further, and the remaining insurer agrees that if the document names only its co-defendant it will engage on the merits and not take the point again.

The claim is reduced by the greatest of three figures: the amount stipulated by the release, the consideration paid for it, or the released party's equitable share of the damages under CPLR article 14. "Whichever is the greatest" is the operative phrase, so what the size of the reduction turns on is the released party's share of responsibility, not the price the claimant accepted.

They agree to fix each party's share by a single joint assessment before any further money changes hands, so the size of the reduction stops being a moving target for all of them.

Subdivision (b) relieves a party given a release in good faith of liability to any other person for contribution, and subdivision (c) makes the trade explicit - that party may claim contribution from nobody either. What decides it is whether the release met the three conditions in subdivision (d): consideration greater than one dollar, complete or substantial termination of the dispute, and delivery before entry of judgment.

They agree to check the release against those three conditions and its delivery date first, and the contribution demand is dropped if it meets them, rather than the argument being run twice.

whether the trial court erred in denying a motion for leave to amend an answer to assert the affirmative defense of setoff under General Obligations Law § 15-108(a) for settlement proceeds

The Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of Advanced's motion which was for leave to amend its answer to assert the affirmative defense of a setoff pursuant to General Obligations Law § 15-108 (a) for the proceeds of a settlement from the settling defendants, because the plaintiffs would not have been prejudiced by the amendment.

The Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of Advanced’s motion which was for leave to amend its answer to assert the affirmative defense of a setoff pursuant to General Obligations Law § 15-108 (a) for the proceeds of a settlement from the settling defendants.

Whether the Supreme Court erred in limiting a defendant's assertion of the affirmative defense of setoff under General Obligations Law § 15-108 to only the amount received from a bankrupt manufacturer.

The Supreme Court erred in limiting the setoff defense to the specific amount received; because it is premature to determine the amount of any potential setoff, the defendant should be permitted to plead the defense in its entirety.

It is premature, at this stage, to make any determination as to the amount of any potential setoff to which Coast may be entitled (see id. at 572).

Whether plaintiffs who settled with investors before judgment can seek contribution from defendants under General Obligations Law § 15-108(c) and (d).

Plaintiffs may not seek contribution because they settled their dispute with the investors for monetary consideration prior to the court entering judgment against them, which triggers the waiver under § 15-108(c) and satisfies the conditions of § 15-108(d).

In this breach of contract action, plaintiffs may not seek contribution from defendants pursuant to General Obligations Law § 15-108 (c) and (d) because they settled their dispute with the investors for monetary consideration prior to the court entering judgment against them (see Gonzales v Armac Indus., 81 NY2d 1, 5-6 [1993]; Carlin v Patel, 99 AD3d 1220, 1221 [4th Dept 2012]).

Whether General Obligations Law § 15-108(a) requires pre-verdict disclosure of a confidential settlement agreement.

The court held that GOB § 15-108(a) is relevant only after a damage verdict in plaintiff's favor, not pre-verdict, so it does not support an argument for pre-verdict production.

These provisions are either inapplicable to a damage award (see CPLR 4545), or are relevant only once a damage verdict in plaintiffs favor has been reached (see General Obligations Law § 15-108 [a]; CPLR 4533-b; Matter of New York County Data Entry Worker Prod. Liab. Litig., 222 AD2d at 382).

Whether releases given by the injured person to settling tortfeasors, executed upon settlement, relieve those tortfeasors from liability for contribution to a non-settling tortfeasor under General Obligations Law § 15-108(b).

Yes, because the releases were given in good faith, the settling tortfeasors are relieved from liability for contribution to the non-settling tortfeasor.

Thus, Raia, Rondos, and Raia & Rondos, EC., established, prima facie, that they were released from liability to C&C for contribution

Does General Obligations Law § 15-108 bar a cross claim for contractual indemnification or common-law indemnification when one tortfeasor has obtained a good faith release from the plaintiffs?

The court held that GOB § 15-108 bars contribution but does not preclude claims based on contractual indemnification; common-law indemnification is also not available because the party seeking it cannot do so when its own alleged wrongdoing gives rise to liability.

While General Obligations Law § 15-108 provides that where, as here, one alleged tortfeasor has obtained a release in good faith from the plaintiffs, that defendant is relieved from liability to any other party for contribution (see General Obligations Law § 15-108), the law does not preclude claims based on indemnification (see Glaser v Fortunoff of Westbury Corp., 71 NY2d 643, 646 [1988]).