Sue a bar for serving drunk driver? Yes - N.Y. GOL §11-101

The section gives a right of action to a person injured in person, property or means of support against anyone who caused or contributed to the intoxication by unlawfully selling the liquor or unlawfully assisting in procuring it. The hinge word is "unlawfully": the complaint is not that the bar served the driver but that the sale itself was unlawful, service to a visibly intoxicated person being the classic instance. So it turns on the driver's visible condition at the time of the last sales, not on the number of drinks.

The bar's insurer and the family agree a contribution towards the lost income for the months the driver cannot work, without either side accepting or denying that the last sale was unlawful, and both keep the terms between themselves.

The action belongs to any person injured in person, property or means of support, so loss of support is a qualifying injury in its own right, and subdivision 2 makes an amount recovered by a husband, wife or child that person's sole and separate property. What separates these two is dependence in fact - whether each of them actually lost means of support, which is a question about who the deceased was supporting rather than about who is closest kin.

They agree to bring one claim together rather than two in competition, and to divide anything recovered by reference to what each was actually receiving from him in the year before he died, set out in a short written schedule they both sign.

Serving a minor is one of the unlawful sales the section reaches, and subdivision 4 governs the parents: either the father or the mother may sue alone, but a recovery by one bars a suit by the other. Whether the check the staff made changes anything is not answered here - § 11-101 attaches to whether the sale was unlawful under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, and it is there that any question about identification belongs.

The parents agree that only one of them will pursue the claim, since a recovery by one bars the other, and they and the bar agree to put the medical bills in front of a neutral before anyone discusses anything larger.

Whether the lower court properly denied summary judgment on claims under General Obligations Law § 11-101 because plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact regarding visible intoxication.

The court held that Supreme Court properly denied summary judgment because plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to whether Gilray exhibited signs of visible intoxication at Central Terminal.

We conclude that Supreme Court properly denied that part of the motion of Central Terminal for summary judgment with respect to the claims against it for violations of General Obligations Law § 11-101 and Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 65.

Whether the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to visible intoxication sufficient to defeat summary judgment on a Dram Shop Act claim under General Obligations Law § 11-101.

The plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the driver was visibly intoxicated while a patron of the bar, so the Supreme Court should have adhered to its prior denial of summary judgment dismissing the Dram Shop Act cause of action.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party (see Vega v Restani Constr. Corp., 18 NY3d 499 [2012]; Pinilla v City of New York, 136 AD3d at 777), the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the driver was visibly intoxicated while he was a patron of Danu (see Sherwood v Otto Jazz, Inc., 142 AD3d 1160, 1161 [2016]; Pinilla v City of New York, 136 AD3d at 777; Conklin v Travers, 129 AD3d at 766; Wasserman v Godoy, 136 AD2d 631, 632 [1988]; cf. Adamy v Ziriakus, 92 NY2d at 402-403; Sullivan v Malinos of Westchester, Inc, 73 AD3d at 1020).

Whether the Supreme Court properly denied Fireside's motion for summary judgment dismissing the Dram Shop Act cause of action under General Obligations Law § 11-101(1).

The Supreme Court properly denied Fireside's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether Fireside served alcohol to Coyle while he was visibly intoxicated.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied Fireside’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.

Whether the plaintiff raised triable issues of fact to defeat summary judgment dismissing the cause of action under General Obligations Law § 11-101.

The court held that the evidence submitted by the plaintiff was sufficient to raise triable issues of fact as to whether Cadena was served alcohol while visibly intoxicated and whether a reasonable connection existed between the sale and the damages, so the Supreme Court properly denied Sangria's motion for summary judgment dismissing the Dram Shop Act cause of action.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Sangria’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of General Obligations Law § 11-101 (see Sullivan v Mulinos of Westchester, Inc., 73 AD3d at 1019-1020; Chatelain v Diamond Jim’s Steakhouse, 295 AD2d 552 [2002]).

Did Surfs Out meet its prima facie burden on summary judgment to dismiss the Dram Shop Act claim?

The court held that Surfs Out failed to meet its burden on summary judgment because there were triable issues of fact regarding visible intoxication and causation, so the order denying summary judgment was affirmed.

Surfs Out did not meet its burden.

Whether the defendants established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing a claim under the Dram Shop Act (General Obligations Law § 11-101) for an assault by an allegedly intoxicated patron.

The evidence submitted by the defendants failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether they served alcohol to the plaintiff's assailant while he was visibly intoxicated or whether their sale of alcohol to him had a connection to the assault, so the defendants did not meet their prima facie burden.

Consequently, the evidence submitted by the defendants failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether they served alcohol to the plaintiff’s assailant while he was visibly intoxicated or whether their sale of alcohol to him had a connection to the assault which occurred within their bar (see Hurtado v Williams, 112 AD3d 1047, 1048-1049 [2013]; cf. Dugan v Olson, 74 AD3d at 1133).