N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-321

Lease negligence exemption void: N.Y. GOL §5-321

N.Y. GOL §5-321 voids any lease covenant that exempts a landlord from liability for injuries to person or property caused by the landlord's negligence.

Official text N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-321 — New York

§ 5-321. Agreements exempting lessors from liability for negligence void and unenforceable. Every covenant, agreement or understanding in or in connection with or collateral to any lease of real property exempting the lessor from liability for damages for injuries to person or property caused by or resulting from the negligence of the lessor, his agents, servants or employees, in the operation or maintenance of the demised premises or the real property containing the demised premises shall be deemed to be void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable.

Text as published in the 2026 snapshot of the code.

Source: Vaquill Open US Law, compiled from official state publishers (huggingface.co), reproduced under license CC BY 4.0.

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What it actually says

One sentence, and it does its work by sweeping. Every covenant, agreement or understanding "in or in connection with or collateral to" any lease of real property that exempts the lessor from liability for damages for injuries to person or property caused by the negligence of the lessor, its agents, servants or employees in the operation or maintenance of the demised premises or of the property containing them, is void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable.

Three phrases carry the weight. "In connection with or collateral to" means the clause cannot be moved out of the lease into a side letter or a rider and survive. "Injuries to person or property" covers both the tenant who falls on the stairs and the tenant whose goods are ruined by a leak. "In the operation or maintenance" locates the negligence: this is about how the landlord runs and looks after the building.

What the section voids is exemption from the landlord's own negligence. It says nothing about a tenant agreeing to carry insurance, and it does not by its terms address a clause allocating risk to whichever party's insurer covers it - a distinction that has generated a great deal of litigation in commercial leases, where the parties are of a different kind from the ones in a residential building. In residential leases, the effect of the section is simple: the paragraph telling the tenant that the landlord is not responsible for anything that happens in the building is unenforceable.

When it applies

  • A lease says the landlord is not liable for any injury occurring on the premises, and the tenant falls on a broken common stair.
  • A clause disclaims responsibility for water damage to the tenant's belongings from a building pipe.
  • A rider signed separately from the lease purports to release the landlord from all claims.
  • A tenant is told a signed waiver bars a claim for an injury caused by an unrepaired condition.

What this section does not say

  • It does not make the landlord liable. It removes a clause; whether the landlord was negligent at all is a separate question the section does not answer.
  • It does not reach the negligence of others. A clause about the acts of other tenants, of contractors who are not the landlord's servants, or of strangers is outside these words.
  • It does not stop a tenant being required to insure. The section voids exemption from liability, and an insurance obligation is not the same thing.
  • It is not a repair obligation. That comes from § 235-b and the housing laws, not from this section.

Worked examples

Invented situations, written to show how the wording bites. They are not real cases, not judgments and not precedent, and nothing here predicts what would happen in yours.

Illustrative example

A tenant falls on an unlit common stairway where the bulb had been out for weeks and reported twice. The managing agent points to a lease paragraph saying the landlord is not responsible for anything that happens in the building.

How the wording applies

Every covenant in, in connection with or collateral to a lease that exempts the lessor from liability for injuries to person or property caused by its own negligence in the operation or maintenance of the premises is void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable. The clause therefore drops out of the conversation, and what is left is the question the section does not answer: whether the landlord was negligent at all.

How the parties settled it

The landlord agrees to meet the medical costs and to fit stairwell lighting that reports its own failure, and the tenant agrees the matter is closed once the work has been signed off.

Illustrative example

A tenant's stored belongings are ruined when a riser pipe fails. The landlord produces a rider, signed on a different day from the lease, releasing them from all claims relating to water.

How the wording applies

The words "in or in connection with or collateral to" any lease are there so the clause cannot be moved into a side letter or a rider and survive, so the separate signing date changes nothing. What does decide it is whose negligence is in question: the section reaches the landlord's own negligence in operating or maintaining the building, not the acts of a stranger or of a contractor who is nobody's servant.

How the parties settled it

They agree a figure for the belongings, using receipts where they exist and a flat sum where they do not, and the landlord confirms in writing that the rider will not be raised against any future claim.

Illustrative example

A lease requires the tenant to carry contents insurance and, two paragraphs later, says the landlord bears no liability for damage of any kind. The tenant reads about the second clause being void and assumes both are dead.

How the wording applies

The section voids exemption from the landlord's own negligence and says nothing about a tenant being required to insure - an insurance obligation is not an exemption from liability. So the two clauses are not in the same position at all, and which of them is being relied on decides the argument.

How the parties settled it

The tenant agrees to keep the contents cover in place and the landlord agrees to strike the exemption paragraph at the next renewal rather than leave an unenforceable term sitting in the document.

How courts have read it

Decisions construing this provision. The question and the summary are ours; the quoted sentence is the court's own words, taken from the published opinion. These are the decisions in our corpus, not every decision there is, and nothing here predicts any other case. Reported 2003 to 2017.

Siegel v. Albertus Magnus High School, 153 A.D.3d 572 (2017)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether the indemnification clause in the agreement between the school defendants and the Generals was void under General Obligations Law § 5-321.

What it held

The court held that General Obligations Law § 5-321 is inapplicable because the agreement is a license, not a lease, and therefore the indemnification clause is not void under that statute.

In the court's words
The agreement constitutes a license and not a lease, and, therefore, General Obligations Law § 5-321 is inapplicable (see Karp v Federated Dept. Stores, 301 AD2d 574, 575 [2003]).

Campisi v. Gambar Food Corp., 130 A.D.3d 854 (2015)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether the indemnification provision in a commercial lease between sophisticated parties is rendered unenforceable by General Obligations Law § 5-321, which voids agreements exempting lessors from liability for negligence.

What it held

General Obligations Law § 5-321 does not preclude enforcement of an indemnification provision in a commercial lease negotiated at arm's length between two sophisticated parties when coupled with an insurance procurement requirement, even if it indemnifies the lessor for its own negligence.

In the court's words
Although General Obligations Law § 5-321 provides that an agreement that purports to exempt a lessor from its own negligence is void and unenforceable, the subject indemnification provision is not rendered unenforceable by this statute.

Nolasco v. Soho Plaza Corp., 129 A.D.3d 924 (2015)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether broad indemnification provisions in a proprietary lease and alteration agreement that are not limited to the lessee's acts or omissions and fail to make exceptions for the lessor's own negligence are enforceable under General Obligations Law § 5-321 where the agreements were not negotiated at arm's length by two sophisticated business entities.

What it held

The court held that such broad indemnification provisions are unenforceable under General Obligations Law § 5-321 where the agreements were not negotiated at arm's length by two sophisticated business entities.

In the court's words
Broad indemnification provisions such as those in the proprietary lease and in the alteration agreement here, which are not limited to the lessee’s acts or omissions, and which fail to make exceptions for the lessor’s own negligence, are unenforceable pursuant to General Obligations Law § 5-321 where the proprietary lease and the alteration agreement were not negotiated at arm’s length by two sophisticated business entities (see Hadzihasanovic v 155 E. 72nd St. Corp., 70 AD3d 637, 638-639 [2010]; DeSabato v 674 Carroll St. Corp., 55 AD3d 656, 657-659 [2008]; cf. Great N. Ins. Co. v Interior Constr. Corp., 7 NY3d 412 [2006]).

Karanikolas v. Elias Taverna, LLC, 120 A.D.3d 552 (2014)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether an indemnification provision in a commercial lease is rendered unenforceable by General Obligations Law § 5-321.

What it held

The court held that General Obligations Law § 5-321 does not preclude enforcement of an indemnification provision in a commercial lease negotiated at arm's length between two sophisticated parties when coupled with an insurance procurement requirement.

In the court's words
Contrary to the contention of Elias Taverna, the indemnification provision in the lease agreement is not rendered unenforceable by General Obligations Law § 5-321, which provides that an agreement that purports to exempt a lessor from its own negligence is void and unenforceable.

Dwyer v. Central Park Studios, Inc., 98 A.D.3d 882 (2012)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Does General Obligations Law § 5-321 render an indemnification provision unenforceable when the indemnitee's liability is purely vicarious and not based on actual negligence?

What it held

The indemnification provision is enforceable under General Obligations Law § 5-321 because there is no evidence that CPS was actually negligent; its liability is purely vicarious.

In the court's words
Thus, because CPS’s liability is purely vicarious under Labor Law § 240 (1), and potentially section 241 (6), enforcement of the indemnification provision does not run afoul of General Obligations Law § 5-321 (see Itri Brick & Concrete Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 786, 795 n 5 [1997]; Correa v 100 W. 32nd St. Realty Corp., 290 AD2d 306, 306 [2002]).

Dibuono v. Abbey, LLC, 95 A.D.3d 1062 (2012)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether General Obligations Law § 5-321 rendered the indemnification provisions in Leases 1 and 2 unenforceable as agreements exempting the lessor from liability for its own negligence.

What it held

The indemnification provisions in Leases 1 and 2 were not rendered unenforceable by General Obligations Law § 5-321 because the liability was to third parties, the leases were commercial agreements negotiated at arm's length between sophisticated parties, and the provisions were coupled with insurance procurement requirements.

In the court's words
Contrary to Palisades’s contention, the indemnification provisions in Leases 1 and 2 were not rendered unenforceable by General Obligations Law § 5-321, which provides that an agreement which purports to exempt a lessor from its own negligence is void and unenforceable.

Source: Caselaw Access Project, CC0 1.0 Universal (public domain dedication).

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We copy this text from the official publisher and re-check it against that source on every page load, but we cannot guarantee it is complete, current or free of error, and we accept no liability for any reliance on it. An amendment can take effect before a consolidation catches up. The publisher's own copy is linked below; where the two differ, it is the official one that counts.

This page reproduces the text of N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-321 in force at the date shown and explains it in general terms. It is not legal advice and takes no account of the circumstances of your case, which can change the answer completely. For a live dispute, for limitation periods, and before taking any step in court, consult a qualified lawyer in New York.

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