Everyone responsible for negligence: CIV § 1714

The section asks whether the shop exercised ordinary care in the management of its property, and reduces responsibility so far as the customer brought the injury on themselves. The fact this hinges on is the twenty minutes: the shop knew about the water, which is a very different case from a spill left by another customer moments before anyone could have found it. The customer's own inattention apportions the loss rather than defeating the claim.

The shop's insurer meets the medical costs and an agreed sum for time off work, reduced by a share reflecting the customer's own care, and the shop adopts a written spill procedure.

The duty is owed to everyone affected by the management of the property, not only to whoever hired the contractor. What decides it is whether leaving the pipe as it was over a weekend was a want of ordinary care: a fitting that failed despite being properly made off is a different case from one left hand-tight.

The contractor's insurer pays for drying and redecoration below and for alternative accommodation during the drying period, with the schedule of works agreed by both owners before it starts.

Subdivisions (b) and (c) say the furnishing of alcohol is not the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication and protect a social host, but subdivision (d) restores a claim against an adult who knowingly furnishes alcohol at their residence to a person they know or should know is under 21. The fact it turns on is knowledge, meaning whether the hosts knew, or should have known, the ages of the guests helping themselves.

The hosts meet the injured guest's uninsured medical costs, and both families agree that gatherings at the house will be alcohol-free while any guest is under 21.

Whether Civil Code section 1714 imposes a duty on employers and premises owners to prevent take-home asbestos exposure to household members.

The court held that the duty of employers and premises owners to exercise ordinary care in their use of asbestos includes preventing exposure to asbestos carried by the bodies and clothing of on-site workers, and that this duty extends only to members of a worker's household.

We hold that the duty of employers and premises owners to exercise ordinary care in their use of asbestos includes preventing exposure to asbestos carried by the bodies and clothing of on-site workers.

Whether the duty of ordinary care under Civil Code section 1714(a) extends to a shuttle operator's boarding procedures.

The court declined to find an exemption from the duty of ordinary care as a matter of law, holding that the shuttle operator owes a duty of ordinary care to passengers in the boarding process.

we would decline to find an exemption from the duty of ordinary care as a matter of law.

Does the civil immunity provided by California's dram shop statutes, including Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (b), protect the manufacturer of an alcoholic beverage from liability for injuries to a consumer when the manufacturer did not 'furnish' the beverage to the consumer?

The civil immunity in California's dram shop statutes, including Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (b), does not extend to a manufacturer that did not furnish the alcoholic beverage to the consumer, because the complaint did not allege the manufacturer exercised control over the product after delivery to a distributor or took an affirmative step to supply it to the consumer.

Therefore, we conclude City Brewing did not “furnish” the beverage to Fiorini and, therefore, the civil immunity in California’s dram shop statutes do not extend to City Brewing.

Did Ford Motor Company owe a duty of care to a plaintiff who was exposed to asbestos from laundering her father's and brother's work clothes, where the asbestos came from Ford's premises?

The court held that Ford owed no duty of care to the plaintiff as a matter of law, reversing the trial court's judgment.

We Conclude Ford Owed Honer No Duty as a Matter of Law.

Whether the general duty of ordinary care under Civil Code section 1714(a) requires the occasional seller of used machinery to owe a duty of care to subsequent users beyond its immediate purchaser to warn of defects or modify the equipment.

The occasional seller of used machinery owes no duty of care to a remote subsequent user—such as an employee of a purchaser who bought the machine from a bank that repossessed it from the immediate buyer—to pass along manufacturers' correspondence or modify the equipment; the trial court's summary judgment for the defendant was affirmed.

Here, however, whatever duty an occasional seller may owe its immediate purchaser, we agree with the trial court that Becker Bros, owed no duty to Garcia—an employee of the purchaser who bought the machinery from the bank which repossessed it from the buyer who bought the slitter line from Becker Bros.—to pass along correspondence received from the manufacturer or to modify the slitter line, particularly in light of the California Code of Regulations provisions mandating that his employer safeguard the workplace as necessary.

whether a freeway driver owes other drivers a duty of ordinary care in choosing whether, where and how to stop on the side of the road

The court held that the general duty of ordinary care under Civil Code section 1714 applies to drivers stopping alongside freeways, and declined to create a categorical exception exempting such parking from that duty.

We therefore decline to create a categorical rule exempting those parking alongside freeways from the duty of drivers to exercise ordinary care for others in their use of streets and highways.