CIV § 1710

4 kinds of deceit under CIV § 1710

CIV § 1710 defines deceit: false suggestion, false assertion without reasonable grounds, suppression when bound to disclose, promise without intent to perform.

Official text CIV § 1710 — California

A deceit, within the meaning of the last section, is either:

  • 1. The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true;
  • 2. The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true;
  • 3. The suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact; or, 4. A promise, made without any intention of performing it.

Text as published in the 2026 snapshot of the code.

Source: Vaquill Open US Law, compiled from official state publishers (huggingface.co), reproduced under license CC BY 4.0.

Read this provision at the official source →

What it actually says

Section 1710 fills in what § 1709 makes actionable. A deceit is one of four things, and reading them separately is what makes the section useful.

First, the suggestion as a fact of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true — a straightforward lie. Second, the assertion as a fact of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true. This is the category people underestimate: an assurance given confidently but with nothing behind it is deceit even though the speaker believed it, which is why "I thought it was fine" is not by itself an answer. Third, the suppression of a fact by one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact. That has two limbs — a duty to disclose, and the separate case of a half-truth, where what was said is true but misleading because of what was left out. Fourth, a promise made without any intention of performing it.

The third category is the one most disputes turn on, and its first limb depends on a duty to disclose arising from somewhere else — a relationship, a statute, a transaction in which the fact is material and known to one side only. The second limb does not: anyone who volunteers information takes on the obligation not to make it misleading by omission. The fourth category is about the state of mind when the promise was made, not about the later failure to perform. Whether a duty to disclose existed on your facts is a question of law and relationship, and belongs with a lawyer.

When it applies

  • A seller who said nothing about a defect they knew about
  • A half-true answer that left out the thing that mattered
  • A confident assurance given by someone who had never checked
  • A promise to pay or to deliver made by someone who never intended to
  • A history of repairs disclosed selectively
  • An agent who described the good part of a report and not the rest

What this section does not say

  • Silence is not always deceit. The third category requires either a duty to disclose the fact or that other information given was likely to mislead without it.
  • It does not require dishonesty in every case. The second category catches an assertion made with no reasonable ground for belief, even where the speaker believed it.
  • A broken promise is not the fourth category. What matters is the absence of any intention to perform when the promise was made.
  • It does not create the liability. Section 1709 is the operative provision; this section supplies the definition it uses.
  • It does not tell you what the loss is. Damages come from § 3333 generally and from § 3343 where the deceit concerned the purchase, sale or exchange of property.

Worked examples

Invented situations, written to show how the wording bites. They are not real cases, not judgments and not precedent, and nothing here predicts what would happen in yours.

Illustrative example

A buyer moves into a house and finds the basement takes water every winter. Neighbours say it has done so for years, and the seller was asked nothing about it before the sale.

How the wording applies

The third category in section 1710 catches suppression of a fact by one bound to disclose it, or who gives other information likely to mislead without it. It hinges on what the seller knew and on what else they said: a seller who volunteered that the basement was dry and usable has given a half-truth, while pure silence raises the harder question of whether a duty to disclose existed.

How the parties settled it

The seller pays an agreed contribution towards a tanking quote obtained by the buyer, released when the work starts, and neither party pursues the other further.

Illustrative example

A car is sold with a folder of service records. The seller shows the recent invoices and leaves out the one describing a major repair after an impact.

How the wording applies

Selecting what to disclose is squarely within the third category, which covers information given that is likely to mislead for want of the rest. What it turns on is that the omitted invoice was in the seller's own folder, which makes the selection deliberate rather than an oversight.

How the parties settled it

The seller refunds an agreed part of the price reflecting the difference the history makes to value, and the buyer keeps the car and the complete records.

Illustrative example

A homeowner asks a fitter whether a new appliance will run on the existing supply and is told confidently that it will. The fitter had not looked at the supply at all, and the appliance trips the circuit every time it runs.

How the wording applies

The second category covers an assertion made as of the speaker's own knowledge with no reasonable ground for believing it true, even where the speaker believed it. The decisive fact is that nothing was checked before the assurance was given, rather than whether the fitter was being dishonest.

How the parties settled it

The fitter carries out the supply upgrade at cost and waives the labour, and the homeowner pays for the parts.

How courts have read it

Decisions construing this provision. The question and the summary are ours; the quoted sentence is the court's own words, taken from the published opinion. These are the decisions in our corpus, not every decision there is, and nothing here predicts any other case. Reported 1991 to 2017.

Linear Technology Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 115 (2007)

Court of Appeal

What the court had to decide

Whether the facts alleged in the fifth amended complaint stated a cause of action for fraud under Civil Code section 1710.

What it held

The court agreed with the trial court's ruling that the facts alleged were insufficient to state a cause of action for fraud or deceit.

In the court's words
We agree with the superior court’s ruling on the claims of fraud and unfair competition but find merit in Linear’s jurisdictional arguments.

Williams v. Wells & Bennett Realtors, 52 Cal. App. 4th 857 (1997)

Court of Appeal

What the court had to decide

Does the two-year statute of limitations in Civil Code section 2079.4 bar causes of action for intentional fraud based on Civil Code section 1710?

What it held

The two-year statute of limitations does not apply to causes of action for intentional fraud, only to negligent misrepresentation based on the statutory duty to inspect and disclose.

In the court's words
We hold that the special statute of limitations does not apply to causes of action for intentional fraud, and we reverse.

Masters v. San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 32 Cal. App. 4th 30 (1995)

Court of Appeal

What the court had to decide

Do Civil Code section 1710's definitions of deceit govern whether a public employee's misrepresentation counts as 'actual fraud' for which Government Code section 822.2 lifts immunity?

What it held

Civil Code section 1710 defines the ordinary elements of deceit, but a public employee is not liable for fraud unless the plaintiff alleges more than those elements—namely, corruption or actual malice.

In the court's words
We agree with the reasoning of the Schonfeld court and likewise hold that, in order to support a cause of action for fraud against the public employees, applicant must allege, in addition to the ordinary elements of common law deceit, motivation by corruption or actual malice.

Source: Caselaw Access Project, CC0 1.0 Universal (public domain dedication).

The same problem elsewhere

The other legal systems in this collection answer the same everyday problem with their own provisions.

The comparison and these one-line summaries are in English.

The seller knew about the defect and said nothing: what the law says in 7 jurisdictions

Read the full comparison →

Related sections

CIV § 1709 Liable for damage from willful deceit: CIV § 1709 CIV § 1572 Actual fraud: 5 types under California CIV § 1572 CIV § 3343 CIV § 3343: Out-of-pocket difference + additional damages

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We copy this text from the official publisher and re-check it against that source on every page load, but we cannot guarantee it is complete, current or free of error, and we accept no liability for any reliance on it. An amendment can take effect before a consolidation catches up. The publisher's own copy is linked below; where the two differ, it is the official one that counts.

This page reproduces the text of CIV § 1710 in force at the date shown and explains it in general terms. It is not legal advice and takes no account of the circumstances of your case, which can change the answer completely. For a live dispute, for limitation periods, and before taking any step in court, consult a qualified lawyer in California.

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