N.Y. General Obligations Law § 9-103

GOL § 9-103: no duty to make land safe for hikers, hunters and snowmobilers

General Obligations Law § 9-103 relieves a landowner of any duty to make land safe for listed recreational uses, with narrow stated exceptions.

Official text N.Y. General Obligations Law § 9-103 — New York

§ 9-103. No duty to keep premises safe for certain uses; responsibility for acts of such users. 1. Except as provided in subdivision two,

a. an owner, lessee or occupant of premises, whether or not posted as provided in section 11-2111 of the environmental conservation law, owes no duty to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for hunting, fishing, organized gleaning as defined in section seventy-one-y of the agriculture and markets law, canoeing, boating, trapping, hiking, cross-country skiing, tobogganing, sledding, speleological activities, horseback riding, bicycle riding, hang gliding, motorized vehicle operation for recreational purposes, snowmobile operation, cutting or gathering of wood for non-commercial purposes or training of dogs, or to give warning of any hazardous condition or use of or structure or activity on such premises to persons entering for such purposes;

b. an owner, lessee or occupant of premises who gives permission to another to pursue any such activities upon such premises does not thereby (1) extend any assurance that the premises are safe for such purpose, or (2) constitute the person to whom permission is granted an invitee to whom a duty of care is owed, or (3) assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by any act of persons to whom the permission is granted.

c. an owner, lessee or occupant of a farm, as defined in section six hundred seventy-one of the labor law, whether or not posted as provided in section 11-2111 of the environmental conservation law, owes no duty to keep such farm safe for entry or use by a person who enters or remains in or upon such farm without consent or privilege, or to give warning of any hazardous condition or use of or structure or activity on such farm to persons so entering or remaining. This shall not be interpreted, or construed, as a limit on liability for acts of gross negligence in addition to those other acts referred to in subdivision two of this section.

  • 2. This section does not limit the liability which would otherwise exist

a. for willful or malicious failure to guard, or to warn against, a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity; or

b. for injury suffered in any case where permission to pursue any of the activities enumerated in this section was granted for a consideration other than the consideration, if any, paid to said landowner by the state or federal government, or permission to train dogs was granted for a consideration other than that provided for in section 11-0925 of the environmental conservation law; or

c. for injury caused, by acts of persons to whom permission to pursue any of the activities enumerated in this section was granted, to other persons as to whom the person granting permission, or the owner, lessee or occupant of the premises, owed a duty to keep the premises safe or to warn of danger.

  • 3. Nothing in this section creates a duty of care or ground of liability for injury to person or property.

Text as published in the 2026 snapshot of the code.

Source: Vaquill Open US Law, compiled from official state publishers (huggingface.co), reproduced under license CC BY 4.0.

Read this provision at the official source →

What it actually says

This section removes a duty rather than creating one. An owner, lessee or occupant of premises - whether or not the land is posted - owes no duty to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for a list of activities, and no duty to warn such entrants of any hazardous condition, use, structure or activity. The list is long and specific: hunting, fishing, organized gleaning, canoeing, boating, trapping, hiking, cross-country skiing, tobogganing, sledding, speleological activities, horseback riding, bicycle riding, hang gliding, motorized vehicle operation for recreational purposes, snowmobile operation, cutting or gathering wood for non-commercial purposes, and training dogs.

Paragraph (b) closes the obvious gap: giving someone permission to pursue those activities does not extend any assurance that the premises are safe, does not make the person an invitee owed a duty of care, and does not make the landowner responsible for injuries caused by the acts of the person permitted. Paragraph (c) adds farms, defined by Labor Law § 671: an owner or occupant of a farm owes no duty to keep it safe for, or to warn, a person entering or remaining without consent or privilege - subject to the section's own limits on gross negligence.

Subdivision 2 sets out the three situations the protection does not reach: willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity; injury where permission to pursue the activity was granted for a consideration (other than payments from the state or federal government, or the dog-training consideration under Environmental Conservation Law § 11-0925); and injury caused by the permitted entrants to other people to whom a duty of care was owed. Subdivision 3 closes the section by saying that nothing in it creates a duty of care or a ground of liability at all.

When it applies

  • A hiker or hunter is injured crossing private woodland and looks to the landowner.
  • A snowmobiler hits an unmarked obstacle on a farm the owner never fenced off.
  • A landowner is asked whether posting signs or granting permission changes their exposure.
  • Someone was charged for access to the land before the accident happened.
  • A trespasser is injured on farmland and claims the owner should have warned them.

What this section does not say

  • It does not protect willful or malicious conduct. Failing deliberately to guard or warn against a known danger is expressly outside the section.
  • It does not apply where access was paid for. Permission granted for consideration takes the case out of the protection.
  • It does not cover every recreational activity - the protection runs to the activities the section lists.
  • It does not shield the landowner from claims by other people injured by the acts of those given permission.
  • It does not create liability where none existed. Subdivision 3 says the section creates no duty of care or ground of liability.

Worked examples

Invented situations, written to show how the wording bites. They are not real cases, not judgments and not precedent, and nothing here predicts what would happen in yours.

Illustrative example

A man walking across a farmer's fields falls into an old drainage ditch hidden by long grass and breaks an ankle. He tells the farmer the ditch should have been fenced or at least signed.

How the wording applies

The section removes the duty rather than balancing it: an owner or occupant owes no duty to keep the premises safe for entry or use for the listed activities, and no duty to warn of any hazardous condition, whether or not the land is posted. Hiking is on the list. What could take the case outside the protection is the first exception - a willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition - so it turns on what the owner knew about that ditch and what he decided to do about it.

How the parties settled it

The farmer agrees to fill and mark the ditch this season and to contribute towards the walker's out-of-pocket costs, and the walker accepts that the path is used at his own risk and will tell anyone he brings the same.

Illustrative example

A landowner charges a modest seasonal fee for permission to ride horses along a woodland trail. A rider is thrown when a plank on a small bridge gives way.

How the wording applies

The second exception applies where permission to pursue the activity was granted for a consideration, other than payments from the state or federal government. That takes the case out of the protection altogether, so the fee rather than the activity is the fact that decides it, and the ordinary rules about the condition of premises are left to operate.

How the parties settled it

The owner meets the medical costs and closes the trail until the bridge is rebuilt and checked, and the season's fees are refunded to everyone who paid them.

Illustrative example

A landowner lets a snowmobile group cross his land for nothing. One of the riders collides with a neighbor walking a dog on an adjoining right of way.

How the wording applies

Paragraph (b) says that granting permission extends no assurance the premises are safe and does not make the landowner responsible for injuries caused by the acts of the person permitted. But the third exception in subdivision 2 preserves claims for injury caused by those entrants to other people to whom a duty of care was owed. So it turns on who was injured and by whose act, not on whether permission had been given.

How the parties settled it

The riders agree a marked route that keeps clear of the right of way and to carry their own insurance, and the landowner posts the route at the gate so walkers know where the machines will be.

How courts have read it

Decisions construing this provision. The question and the summary are ours; the quoted sentence is the court's own words, taken from the published opinion. These are the decisions in our corpus, not every decision there is, and nothing here predicts any other case. Reported 2003 to 2017.

Drake v. Sagbolt, LLC, 112 A.D.3d 1132 (2013)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether General Obligations Law § 9-103(1)(a) shields a landowner from liability when the plaintiff was walking on a paved walkway with her dogs and the landowner claims she was engaged in hiking or dog training.

What it held

The court held that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff was engaged in one of the specified recreational activities (hiking or training dogs) at the time of her injury, and therefore the statute did not shield the defendant from liability.

In the court's words
Here, defendant has failed to demonstrate, as required, that plaintiff was engaged in one of the specified activities at the time she was injured.

Ferland v. GMO Renewable Resources LLC, 105 A.D.3d 1158 (2013)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether the consideration exception to General Obligations Law § 9-103 applied to deny immunity to the landowner and snowmobile clubs.

What it held

The consideration exception did not apply because there was no evidence of any nexus between the rents received by the landowner under recreation leases and the blanket permission granted to all snowmobilers to use the property for snowmobiling, and the insurance provision in the use agreement did not constitute consideration.

In the court's words
In sum, as the evidence establishes that the snowmobile trails were open to the public without charge, and plaintiff failed to show that the consideration exception applies, Supreme Court properly ruled that Fund 6, as the landowner, and SLCSA and the snowmobile clubs, as occupiers, are entitled to immunity pursuant to General Obligation Law § 9-103 (see Bellone v J.R. Shooting Preserve, 192 AD2d 633, 633 [1993]; Dean v Glens Falls Country Club, 170 AD2d 798, 799 [1991]).

O'Neill v. Town of Dover, 100 A.D.3d 845 (2012)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether the defendant was entitled to immunity from liability under General Obligations Law § 9-103 for a plaintiff injured while hiking on its property.

What it held

The defendant established its prima facie entitlement to immunity under General Obligations Law § 9-103 by showing it owned the property, the plaintiff was engaged in hiking (a specified recreational activity), and the property was suitable for that use; the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, so summary judgment was properly granted.

In the court's words
In support of its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the ground of its immunity from liability pursuant to General Obligations Law § 9-103 with evidence that it owned the property upon which the plaintiffs accident occurred, the plaintiff was engaged in one of the recreational activities specified by the statute, namely, hiking, and the property was suitable for that recreational use (see Albright v Metz, 88 NY2d 656, 662 [1996]; Fredette v Town of Southampton, 95 AD3d 940, 940-941 [2012]; Rivera v Glen Oaks Vil. Owners, Inc., 41 AD3d 817, 818-819 [2007]; Olson v Brun ner, 261 AD2d 922, 922-923 [1999]).

McKown v. Town of Waterford, 94 A.D.3d 1182 (2012)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Does General Obligations Law § 9-103 shield a municipality from liability for injuries sustained by a plaintiff operating an ATV in a public park?

What it held

The statute shields defendant from liability because defendant did not operate a supervised public park and the land was suitable for ATV use.

In the court's words
General Obligations Law § 9-103 shields defendant from liability for plaintiffs injuries.

Shay v. Contento, 92 A.D.3d 994 (2012)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Does General Obligations Law § 9-103 shield the defendants from liability for the plaintiff's injury?

What it held

General Obligations Law § 9-103 is not a complete bar to recovery because the negligence alleged by the plaintiff is not related solely to the condition of the defendants' property but also to an independent duty separate and distinct therefrom.

In the court's words
Here, inasmuch as the negligence alleged by plaintiff is not related solely to the condition of defendants’ property itself, but also to an independent duty separate and distinct therefrom, General Obligations Law § 9-103 is not a complete bar to recovery

Thomann v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 90 A.D.3d 1583 (2011)

Appellate Division

What the court had to decide

Whether Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. was entitled to immunity from liability under General Obligations Law § 9-103 for injuries sustained by a snowmobiler striking a guy wire on a bike path.

What it held

The court held that Niagara Mohawk was immune under § 9-103 because it was an occupant of the premises and the bike path was appropriate for snowmobiling, and the willful conduct exception did not apply.

In the court's words
We conclude that Supreme Court properly granted the motion.

Source: Caselaw Access Project, CC0 1.0 Universal (public domain dedication).

Related sections

N.Y. Real Property Law § 335-a Lay utility lines under private road – NY RPL § 335-a N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-321 Lease negligence exemption void: N.Y. GOL §5-321

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We copy this text from the official publisher and re-check it against that source on every page load, but we cannot guarantee it is complete, current or free of error, and we accept no liability for any reliance on it. An amendment can take effect before a consolidation catches up. The publisher's own copy is linked below; where the two differ, it is the official one that counts.

This page reproduces the text of N.Y. General Obligations Law § 9-103 in force at the date shown and explains it in general terms. It is not legal advice and takes no account of the circumstances of your case, which can change the answer completely. For a live dispute, for limitation periods, and before taking any step in court, consult a qualified lawyer in New York.

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