Liable for Willful Failure: N.Y. Real Property Law § 465

A seller who provides the statement is liable only for a willful failure to perform the requirements of the article, and then for the actual damages suffered by the buyer, in addition to any other equitable or statutory remedy. The state of mind is what carries it: an honest mistake, or something the seller did not know, is outside the section, and the photographs go to whether the answer was willful.

The seller pays the documented cost of the drainage work and the buyers' survey fee, and both record that the payment settles everything arising from the sale.

The form frames answers as based on the seller's actual knowledge at the time of signing, and this section attaches liability only to a willful failure to perform the article's requirements. So it turns on what the seller knew when the box was ticked: an "unknown" from someone who did the work himself stands differently from one given by a seller who inherited the house.

The seller meets half the cost of putting the system right and signs a corrected statement for the file, and the buyer drops any wider claim.

Subdivision 1 says the opposite: nothing in the article limits any existing cause of action or remedy at law, in statute or in equity. Claims for active concealment, fraud, and breach of terms negotiated between the parties survive alongside it, and New York's background rule of caveat emptor is not displaced by the article. So what decides the route is the facts, not the existence of the form.

They put a single figure to the seller covering the repairs and stop running separate theories, on the basis that payment closes everything arising from the condition of the house.

What is the remedy for a seller's failure to provide a property condition disclosure statement under Real Property Law § 465?

The remedy for failure to provide a property condition disclosure statement is a $500 credit to be received at closing, and only the seller/owner can be liable under that statute.

The applicable remedy was, therefore, a $500 credit to be received at closing (see Real Property Law § 465 [1]; Bishop v Graziano, 10 Misc 3d 342, 345 [2005]).

What must a buyer allege to state a claim under Real Property Law § 465(2) for a seller's willful failure to disclose in a Property Condition Disclosure Statement?

A claim under Real Property Law § 465(2) requires the buyer to allege that the seller willfully failed to comply with an obligation under article 14, resulting in damages, and that the seller had actual knowledge of a condition that was misrepresented in the disclosure statement.

Accordingly, a claim under Real Property Law § 465 (2) must allege the seller’s willful failure to comply with one or more of the obligations imposed on the seller under article 14, resulting in the buyer’s damages, and a claim for willful failure to disclose under this provision must allege that the seller had actual knowledge of a condition that was misrepresented by the disclosure contained in the PCDS.

Does Real Property Law § 465(2) create a private cause of action for willful misrepresentations in a property condition disclosure statement?

The court held that § 465(2) does not create a cause of action; it is unenforceable because the term 'willful failure to perform the requirements of this article' is ambiguous and the Legislature has not defined the elements.

As this court concludes that there is no cause of action created under Real Property Law § 465 (2), and further, that the plaintiff has failed to prove a successful claim under the common law, the lower court’s decision is affirmed.

Does a seller's misrepresentation in the statutorily prescribed property condition disclosure statement constitute a 'willful failure to perform' under Real Property Law § 465(2), and if so, what remedy is available?

The court held that a seller's knowingly false misrepresentation in the disclosure statement does constitute a willful failure to perform under § 465(2), allowing the buyer to recover actual damages, and that the statute provides a cumulative remedy beyond common law.

Without question, the record supports a section 465 (2) cause of action.

Do any breach of contract or common-law fraud claims survive the tender of a 'merged' deed pursuant to an 'as is' real estate transfer, if the seller elects not to make Real Property Law § 462 representations and instead pays the $500 provided by section 465 (1)?

The court held that neither breach of contract nor common-law fraud claims survive when the seller elects to pay the $500 credit under § 465(1) instead of providing a disclosure statement, because the merger clause extinguishes contract claims and the lack of any representations precludes a fraud claim.

With the statutory remedy being unavailable, the court adopts the Malach court’s dicta that opt-out sellers are still subject to the common law or existing statutory theories.

What is the proper interpretation of Real Property Law § 465(2) and whether a buyer can recover under it when the seller delivered an incomplete property condition disclosure statement?

The court held that a buyer cannot recover under § 465(2) because the buyer accepted an incomplete disclosure statement and did not justifiably rely on it, and that the buyer is entitled to a $500 credit under § 465(1) for the seller's failure to deliver a completed form.

The court finds that what the plaintiff seeks is beyond the intended reach of the statute.